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Diane Lourdes Dick* 
Abstract: The conventional wisdom holds that out-of-court loan restructurings are mostly 
consensual and collaborative. But this is no longer accurate. Highly aggressive, 
nonconsensual restructuring transactions—what I call “hostile restructurings”—are becoming 
a common feature of the capital markets. Relying on hypertechnical interpretations of loan 
agreements, one increasingly popular hostile restructuring method involves issuing new debt 
that enjoys higher priority than the existing debt; another involves transferring the most 
valuable collateral away from existing lenders to secure new borrowing. 
These transactions are distinguishable from normal out-of-court restructurings by their 
use of coercive tactics to overcome not only the traditional minority lender holdout problem, 
but also the collective bargaining power of the entire lender group. In other words, in hostile 
restructurings, the goal of the negotiations is not simply to cram the restructuring down the 
throats of a self-interested or misguided minority holdout; instead, the goal is to cram the 
plan down on the entire lender group by pitting similarly situated lenders against one another. 
Hostile restructurings not only strain normal interlender dynamics—they also challenge 
traditional understandings of what it means to be a senior secured creditor. The ensuing 
lender arms race has, in turn, carved new fault lines in chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. 
Using detailed case studies, this Article is the first to explore both how these hostile 
restructurings differ from the traditional interlender conflict dynamics and how they amplify 
the distributional concerns that have traditionally plagued bankruptcy restructurings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Financially distressed and overleveraged companies generally have 
two options for restructuring their bank and non-bank private debt.1 
Such companies can file for chapter 11 bankruptcy2 on either a 
prearranged or “free fall” basis and seek judicial confirmation of a plan 
of reorganization,3 or they can convince senior lenders to amend or 
restate the loan agreement to give the debtor more breathing room.4 The 
traditional wisdom holds that an out-of-court restructuring of this sort is 
almost always more efficient because it avoids the costs and 
uncertainties of a bankruptcy filing; however, it can be difficult to 
achieve because it requires collaboration and consensus. After all, senior 
lenders—who hold the highest priority claims against the company—
must agree to voluntarily impair their own bargained-for rights; 
 
1. It is important to distinguish between bank and non-bank private debt, on the one hand, and 
public securities (such as bonds) on the other, because the latter is subject to a far more extensive 
legal and regulatory framework. For more on this distinction, see Jayant R. Kale & Costanza 
Meneghetti, The Choice Between Public and Private Debt: A Survey, 23 IIMB MGMT. REV. 5 
(2011). 
2. Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to 
“establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” Using 
this authority, Congress has passed a series of bankruptcy laws, the most recent being the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 
11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532). Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the reorganization of 
bankrupt persons. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1174. 
3. The chapter 11 plan of reorganization identifies, among other things, how various classes of 
creditors and interest holders will be treated and what specific distributions will be made from the 
bankruptcy estate. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1129(a) (detailing plan confirmation requirements). 
4. For a classic expression of this choice, see Stuart C. Gilson, Kose John & Larry H.P. Lang, 
Troubled Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Study of Private Reorganization of Firms in Default, 
27 J. FIN. ECON. 315 (1990). 
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meanwhile, without the benefit of bankruptcy’s automatic stay,5 other 
stakeholders, such as junior lenders, landlords, trade creditors, and 
equity owners, may disrupt the restructuring by exercising their own 
remedies against the debtor. 
Making out-of-court restructurings more difficult is the fact that the 
company’s senior lenders—particularly when they have liens on all or 
substantially all of the company’s assets—exercise enormous bargaining 
power in setting the terms of any potential restructuring. Senior lenders 
will naturally prefer restructuring proposals that provide them the surest 
and quickest recovery, even if it comes at the expense of the firm’s 
future as a going concern.6 
These preferences and power dynamics alone make it increasingly 
difficult to achieve a meaningful consensual restructuring. But 
complicating things further is the fact that big companies typically 
obtain loans from large syndicates of lenders.7 And, even if most of the 
lenders agree to the terms of an out-of-court restructuring, a minority of 
lenders may refuse to make any concessions—either because they do not 
believe the restructuring makes sense, or because they believe that by 
holding out they can obtain a better deal.8 Depending on the consent 
thresholds required for modifications to the company’s loan agreements, 
these holdouts may derail the entire restructuring; at a minimum, they 
will certainly make it more expensive. 
In contrast, bankruptcy offers a legal framework to shift some 
bargaining power to the debtor, neutralize the holdout risk, and provide a 
limited pathway for nonconsensual restructurings.9 And, while 
bankruptcy law provides a range of protections for secured creditors, it 
also helps to recenter restructuring discussions around enhancing the 
company’s long-term prospects as a going concern and maximizing the 
 
5. See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
6. “The term ‘going concern value’ refers to the value of assets held together and used in a 
business operation. This value is typically contrasted against ‘liquidation value,’ which is generally 
defined as the value of the assets, sold on a piecemeal basis, less the costs of sale.” Christopher W. 
Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 
89, 92 n.8 (1992).  
7. A syndicated loan is typically arranged and administered by agents who serve on behalf of the 
various bank and non-bank lenders. As the Second Circuit recently confirmed, syndicated loans are 
not considered securities. See Kirschner v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 17 Civ. 6334, 2020 
WL 2614765, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2020). 
8. On the minority holdout problem in corporate restructurings, see infra notes 46–47 and 
accompanying text. 
9. So-called cramdowns are authorized under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1), which provides that a plan 
that satisfies all other requisite provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) may be confirmed over the 
objection of one or more classes. 
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potential recoveries of all stakeholders. 
But despite these attractive features, bankruptcy is generally 
perceived as a nuclear option—it can be expensive, time-consuming, and 
it has profound implications for the firm’s entire capital structure.10 For 
these reasons, the conventional wisdom surrounding private debt 
modifications is that struggling companies must weigh the benefits of a 
limited, imperfect, consensual out-of-court restructuring against the risks 
and downsides that accompany a more holistic bankruptcy 
reorganization. 
But recent developments in the U.S. capital markets—namely, the rise 
of what I call “hostile” out-of-court private loan restructurings11—have 
upended this conventional wisdom. Financially distressed companies 
increasingly use highly aggressive out-of-court restructuring 
transactions—referred to by finance professionals as “liability 
management transactions”12 or “lender-on-lender violence”13—to 
 
10. I examine these and related perceptions of bankruptcy in Diane Lourdes Dick, Bankruptcy, 
Bailout, or Bust: Early Corporate Responses to the Business and Financial Challenges of Covid-19, 
40 BANKR. L. LETTER (Thompson Reuters, St. Paul, Minn.), July 2020, at 1, 7. 
11. In corporate law, a “hostile takeover” occurs when a predator firm acquires control of a target 
company despite resistance by the target’s management. For a classic discussion, see John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender 
Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984). 
12. The term was used in a September 2020 program hosted by the highly influential Loan 
Syndications and Trading Association. See Meyer Dworkin, Jason Kyrwood, Bridget Marsh, Brian 
Resnick & Ken Steinberg, Recent Distressed Liability Management Transactions: Lessons for the 
Loan Market, LSTA (Sept. 29, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://www.lsta.org/events/recent-distressed-
liability-management-transactions-lessons-for-the-loan-market (last visited Nov. 6, 2021) 
[hereinafter LSTA Presentation]. 
13. Patrick D. Walling, Navigating the Club in Private Credit Deals, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 3, 
2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/navigating-club-private-credit-deals [https://perma.cc/ 
YD7C-E65T] (observing that others have used the phrase). Like Walling, I only mention it in 
passing to identify the subject of the Article. I avoid further uses of the phrase (along with its 
variant, “creditor-on-creditor violence”) because of its similarity to—and possible derivation 
from—the problematic term “Black-on-[B]lack violence.” See generally Alicia McElhaney, 
‘Creditor-on-Creditor Violence’ Lands Big Managers in Court, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Nov. 20, 
2020), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1pbjxp892zp1x/Creditor-on-Creditor-
Violence-Lands-Big-Managers-in-Court [https://perma.cc/J295-LDWH] (describing the trend of 
“creditor-on-creditor violence”); Jo Ellen Fair, “Black-on-Black”: Race, Space, and News of 
Africans and African Americans, 22 ISSUE: J. OP. 35, 35–37 (1994) (examining the “meaning of a 
racial label, ‘black-on-black,’ as it is used in U.S. news stories to define and describe crime and 
violence in the United States and South Africa”). The latter term has been used by some observers 
to undermine demands for police reforms; as one commentator recently explained, “‘Black-on-
[B]lack crime’ is a frame that presupposes [B]lack criminality—that there’s something inherent to 
[B]lackness which makes intra-group crime more prevalent and more deadly.” Jamelle Bouie, Why 
“Black-on-Black Crime” Is a Dangerous Idea, AM. PROSPECT (July 17, 2013), 
https://prospect.org/power/black-on-black-crime-dangerous-idea/ [https://perma.cc/5LRJ-QB8X]. In 
light of these associations, the use of the term to describe corporate debt restructuring dynamics is 
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achieve, in substance, the sort of senior loan modifications that they 
previously could only achieve through a bankruptcy reorganization. And 
in some cases, companies have been able to do things that they would 
not even be allowed to do in bankruptcy. 
Companies generally initiate hostile restructurings by carefully 
reviewing their existing senior loan agreements—which are typically 
hundreds of pages long—in search of provisions that technically allow 
them to do things that arguably violate the spirit of the agreement. This 
approach not only exploits the plain language of the contract—it also 
exploits decades of statutory and judicial law directing courts to enforce 
contracts and otherwise stay out of commercial disputes.14 Relying on 
hypertechnical interpretations of loan agreements,15 one increasingly 
popular hostile restructuring method involves issuing new debt that 
enjoys higher priority than the existing debt; another involves 
transferring the most valuable collateral away from existing lenders to 
secure new borrowing. 
A key feature of hostile restructurings is that the opportunity to 
participate is made available only to certain lenders—usually the precise 
number of lenders needed to satisfy the applicable consent thresholds in 
the existing agreements. The other lenders often have no idea a deal is 
even being negotiated; they may learn about it for the first time when 
they read the company’s press release announcing the restructuring. And 
the missed opportunity carries a high cost. Lenders who are not included 
in the restructuring find that their rights have been economically 
impaired. For instance, their debt may be subordinated to hundreds of 
millions of dollars in new debt, or they may no longer have a meaningful 
interest in the company’s most valuable collateral. 
As one would expect, hostile restructurings have captured the 
attention of capital market participants,16 their advisors,17 and even the 
 
insensitive and unnecessary.  
14. Diane Lourdes Dick, Confronting the Certainty Imperative in Corporate Finance 
Jurisprudence, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1461, 1465. 
15. For instance, in one of the case studies profiled in this Article, the debtor company relied on 
language in the loan agreement authorizing new extensions of credit under the facility in order to 
issue debt purely for the purpose of meeting consent thresholds for major changes. See infra notes 
213–223 and accompanying text. 
16. See, e.g., Sally Bakewell, Apollo’s Debt-Lawsuit Defeat to Reshape Wall Street Risk Models, 
BLOOMBERG (July 9, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-
09/apollo-s-debt-lawsuit-defeat-to-reshape-wall-street-risk-models (last visited Nov. 1, 2021) 
(discussing a key case illustrating the rise of aggressive debt restructuring transactions); Matt Wirz, 
Apollo Sues Serta Simmons and Owner Advent Over Debt Dispute, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2020, 
6:03 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/apollo-sues-serta-simmons-and-owner-advent-over-debt-
dispute-11591906294 (last visited Sept. 16, 2021) (exploring the use of “controversial maneuvers” 
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influential trade association for the U.S. syndicated loan market, the 
Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA).18 These 
transactions have prompted lawsuits in state court, federal district court, 
and federal bankruptcy court, with plaintiffs alleging the same troubling 
dynamics that prompted Congress—nearly a century ago—to severely 
restrict out-of-court restructurings of publicly traded bond debt. 
These hostile restructurings have strained normal interlender 
dynamics while also challenging traditional understandings of what it 
means to be a senior secured creditor. And, while some aspects of these 
transactions may be thwarted by defensive drafting—such as more 
restrictive covenants in the underlying loan agreements—savvy debtor 
companies and their advisors may continue to design new hostile 
restructurings that exploit other hypertechnical provisions in their loan 
agreements. Whether it plays out ex ante or ex post, the ensuing lender 
arms race has, in turn, carved new fault lines in corporate bankruptcy 
proceedings. Indeed, recent chapter 11 cases suggest that it is becoming 
more difficult to reach consensus among ever more fractured lender 
groups, with minority lenders in some cases forming ad hoc groups to 
oppose the restructuring and advance alternative transactions.19 
As market participants and their advisors struggle to adjust to this 
new world of hostile restructurings, the question for courts and 
lawmakers is whether these transactions should be accepted as 
innovative and competitive responses to corporate financial distress, or 
as normative failures in the capital markets that require corrective legal 
or regulatory action. Drawing insights from recent case studies,20 this 
Article provides the first comprehensive academic treatment of hostile 
restructurings. I show how hostile restructurings have the potential to 
destroy value, impair the smooth functioning of the capital markets, and 
introduce and amplify the distributional concerns that have traditionally 
 
in recent debt restructurings). 
17. Several major commercial law firms have hosted fascinating podcasts on the topic. See, e.g., 
The Cramdown Podcast, Lender on Lender Priming, O’MELVENY & MYERS, LLP (Dec. 3, 2020), 
https://www.omm.com/resources/alerts-and-publications/alerts/the-cramdown-restructuring-
podcast-episode-4 [https://perma.cc/QAA3-TZFT] (offering lively discourse on the growing use of 
aggressive debt restructuring maneuvers). 
18. See LSTA Presentation, supra note 12. 
19. See, e.g., Statement of the First Lien Minority Group Regarding the Debtors’ Sale Motion and 
Limited Objection to Approval of the Disclosure Statement, In re J.C. Penney Co., No. 20-20182 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 4, 2020) (setting forth a group of minority lenders’ objections); see also 
Andrew Scurria, J.C. Penney Lenders Trade Barbs Over Chapter 11 Split, WSJ PRO BANKR. (Oct. 
26, 2020, 8:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/j-c-penney-lenders-trade-barbs-over-chapter-11-
split-11603759734 (last visited Nov. 1, 2021) (discussing the interlender conflicts). 
20. See infra Part II. 
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plagued bankruptcy restructurings.21 
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I describes the conventional 
wisdom of loan restructuring, focusing on out-of-court restructurings 
and bankruptcy reorganizations under chapter 11. Part II challenges the 
conventional wisdom by detailing the rise of hostile restructurings. This 
Part draws from rich case studies of “uptiering” and “dropdown” style 
hostile restructurings.22 Part III shifts from descriptive to normative, 
arguing that hostile restructurings constitute a normative failure in the 
capital markets. This is because they violate the most fundamental 
norms and values underlying commercial law and practice. First, hostile 
restructurings threaten the important goals of legal certainty and 
predictability in the capital markets. Second, they violate classic and 
emerging theoretical justifications for nonconsensual adjustments to loan 
agreements. Finally, these transactions have the potential to interfere 
with the smooth functioning of the capital markets, causing dangerous 
ripple effects. Part IV explores a variety of prescriptive solutions to 
correct the normative failure, ultimately settling on a recommendation 
that courts should provide a more holistic, standards-based review of 
hostile restructurings. Part V concludes. 
I. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM OF LOAN 
RESTRUCTURING 
In commercial finance, the term “restructuring” refers to the process 
by which firms substantially change their debt contracts.23 There are 
many reasons why firms may choose to pursue loan restructurings.24 In 
many cases, the restructuring is motivated by corporate financial 
distress; in others, the restructuring is driven by the desire to seize some 
opportunity that is currently prohibited by existing loan agreements.25 
In practice, restructuring discussions tend to arise because the 
company is in default of its commitments under the loan agreement. For 
instance, most loan agreements require ongoing compliance with strict 
financial covenants that test the firm’s condition and performance 
 
21. See infra Part III. 
22. These terms, which denote two popular methods of hostile restructuring, are used in the 
LSTA Presentation, supra note 12. 
23. STUART C. GILSON, CREATING VALUE THROUGH CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING: CASE 
STUDIES IN BANKRUPTCIES, BUYOUTS, AND BREAKUPS 781 (2010) (building a similar definition 
from the seminal corporate finance scholarship of Michael Jensen and William Meckling). 
24. Id. at 781–82. 
25. Id. 
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against certain negotiated ratios and other metrics.26 Violations of these 
covenants constitute events of default even if the company is current on 
all required interest and principal payments. When a company is in 
default, the lender has the right to exercise remedies against the 
borrower, such as acceleration and collection and, in the case of secured 
financing, repossession and foreclosure.27 
Even in the face of severe financial or economic challenges, corporate 
shareholders and managers will often prefer to restructure rather than 
liquidate because it preserves their ongoing interest in (and control over) 
the firm.28 But economically speaking, restructuring only makes sense if 
the firm is worth saving as a going concern;29 otherwise, the firm should 
be liquidated so that any remaining assets and investment capital can be 
redeployed in more productive and profitable ways.30 If the firm has 
greater value as a going concern, then a fair and efficient restructuring 
has the potential to stabilize the distressed business and preserve or even 
enhance the firm’s going concern value; this, in turn, has the added 
benefit of advancing the economic interests of employees, shareholders, 
and the countless suppliers, vendors, and other parties that conduct 
business with the company. 
Once controlling stakeholders decide to restructure, they may engage 
in formal legal proceedings, such as chapter 11 bankruptcy, or out-of-
court negotiations. What drives the choice between the two?31 
Conventional wisdom holds that the main difference between out-of-
court restructuring and bankruptcy restructuring is that the former 
 
26. For a discussion of common financial covenants, see Robert M. Lloyd, Financial Covenants 
in Commercial Loan Documentation: Uses and Limitations, 58 TENN. L. REV. 335 (1991). 
27. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-601(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (“After default, a 
secured party has the rights provided in this part and . . . those provided by agreement of the parties. 
A secured party . . . may reduce a claim to judgment, foreclose, or otherwise enforce the claim [or] 
security interest . . . by any available judicial procedure . . . .”). 
28. These preferences, and the failure of modern corporate law to properly restrain them, are 
explored in Jared A. Ellias & Robert J. Stark, Bankruptcy Hardball, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 745 (2020). 
29. Douglas G. Baird, Priority Matters: Absolute Priority, Relative Priority, and the Costs of 
Bankruptcy, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 789 (2017) (“When a firm has value as a going concern, the 
investors as a group are better off if it remains intact even when it is in financial distress and not 
able to pay all of its bills.”). 
30. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the 
Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921, 924 (2001). 
31. A recent article explains that bankruptcy and out-of-court restructurings are not necessarily 
opposing choices, but can be complementary choices; for instance, an initial out-of-court 
restructuring can pave the way for a more efficient bankruptcy restructuring. See Jason Roderick 
Donaldson, Edward R. Morrison, Giorgia Piacentino & Xiaobo Yu, Restructuring vs. Bankruptcy 
34–36 (Colum. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 630, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=3698161 [https://perma.cc/X3CU-6WFF]. 
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process is largely voluntary, consensual, and collaborative, reflecting a 
shared vision to restructure out of court and avoid the increased risks and 
costs associated with bankruptcy process. In contrast, bankruptcy—
while costly, risky, and often time-consuming—offers a legal framework 
to neutralize certain obstacles that often prevent fair and efficient out-of-
court restructurings, such as extreme imbalances in bargaining power, 
senior lenders’ collective refusal to look beyond their own self-interest, 
and the problem of minority holdouts. The following sections explore 
the conventional wisdom in more detail, beginning with the classic 
assumptions surrounding out-of-court restructurings. 
A. The Conventional Wisdom of Out-of-Court Restructurings 
Also known as a “workout,”32 an out-of-court restructuring is a 
negotiated settlement between the company and some or all of its 
lenders outside of any formal, court-administered bankruptcy or 
insolvency process. Because this Article is focused on private debt, an 
out-of-court restructuring for these purposes means that lenders agree to 
voluntarily impair their own bargained-for rights and enter into new 
agreements with the debtor setting forth repayment and other terms. 
Building on an earlier point, lenders should, in theory, agree to an 
out-of-court restructuring only if they believe that the firm is worth more 
as a going concern; if the lenders do not share this belief, they should 
prefer liquidation in order to avoid the risk of further losses, retrieve 
what remains of their investment, and deploy their capital elsewhere for 
potentially greater returns.33 Senior lenders may realize their liquidation 
preference by enforcing—or, in many cases, simply threatening to 
enforce—their rights and remedies under the loan agreements, or, less 
commonly, by pushing the company into an involuntary bankruptcy. 
Of course, much of this assumes that stakeholders are able to quickly 
ascertain the firm’s intrinsic value and make decisions based on these 
dollar amounts. In reality, corporate valuation is a difficult and inexact 
blend of art and science, and stakeholders often have widely divergent 
views on the value of the company as a going concern. But assuming 
stakeholders sufficiently agree on a value thesis, all stakeholders should 
prefer the more flexible, less costly, and less invasive option of an out-
of-court restructuring.34 
 
32. See, e.g., Conrad B. Duberstein, Out-of-Court Workouts, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 347 
(1993) (providing an overview of out-of-court restructurings). 
33. See sources cited supra notes 29–30. 
34. See Gilson et al., supra note 4, at 318. 
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Many of these benefits of out-of-court restructurings can be traced to 
a lack of regulatory or judicial oversight.35 Unlike other recapitalization 
transactions, such as those involving public bond and equity securities, 
out-of-court loan restructurings are not subject to any specialized legal 
or regulatory regime. Instead, much like the relationship between a 
debtor and its creditors generally, out-of-court restructurings are 
properly analyzed under a patchwork of corporate, commercial, and 
contract laws.36 
As exercises in contract negotiation, restructurings are subject to the 
terms of the existing loan agreements and to general state contract laws 
that govern the interpretation of those agreements and the parties’ entry 
into new agreements. Then, pursuant to a prevailing legal paradigm in 
commercial law that promotes legal certainty, predictability, and 
uniformity above virtually all other interests, courts have tended to 
strictly enforce the plain language of whatever agreements may be 
reached. Courts tend to avoid interposing thorny equitable doctrines or 
judge-made law out of fear that they might interfere with the smooth 
functioning of the capital markets.37 
Out-of-court restructurings typically take the form of an extension, a 
composition, or a debt-for-equity swap. An extension involves a 
restructuring of the maturity date, the interest rate, and the amount and 
timing of any required principal and/or interest payments.38 It may also 
involve a restructuring of key nonmonetary terms, such as the debtor’s 
obligation to comply with ongoing covenants or the presence and extent 
of any credit enhancements, such as collateral or guarantees.39 A 
 
35. I discuss the lack of regulatory or judicial oversight in commercial finance transactions in a 
previous work. See generally Dick, supra note 14. 
36. For a thoughtful exposition on the patchwork of laws governing debtor-creditor relations 
generally, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligations to Creditors, 17 
CARDOZO L. REV. 647 (1996). On the corporate laws setting forth the duties of corporate managers 
in times of distress, see Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate 
Duty to Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321 (2007). 
37. See generally Dick, supra note 14. 
38. The term “extension” may or may not be used in reference to the restructuring transaction. 
For an example of a restructuring of this sort, see Great Plains Real Est. Dev., L.L.C. v. Union Cent. 
Life Ins. Co., No. 4:05–CV–002204, 2007 WL 6908824, at *3 (S.D. Iowa June 4, 2007), noting 
“[t]he Extension Agreement provided Great Plains with a lower interest rate and extended maturity 
date, and obligated plaintiff to tender a one-time principal payment of $391,280.96.” 
39. For instance, the Canadian company NFI Group Inc. recently engaged in an out-of-court 
restructuring of its debt facility, relaxing covenants in order to give the company some much-needed 
breathing room while recovering from a global pandemic. Press Release, NFI Group Inc., NFI 
Group Announces Amendments to Its Credit Facilities (Dec. 23, 2020), 
https://www.nfigroup.com/2020/12/23/nfi-group-announces-amendments-to-its-credit-facilities/ 
[https://perma.cc/5KGB-SRMA]. 
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composition takes things even further, with lenders agreeing to 
restructure not only the foregoing items but also the principal amount of 
the debt.40 By agreeing to forgive some of the outstanding obligations, 
lenders allow the debtor to deleverage its balance sheet. 
In contrast, a debt-for-equity swap occurs when lenders agree to 
surrender all or part of their debt claims in exchange for equity in the 
firm.41 This can help the company achieve full deleveraging; however, it 
also dilutes existing equity interests, forcing them to share the future 
upside potential with stakeholders who previously held only a fixed 
claim on the assets of the firm. Finally, parties to out-of-court 
restructurings may blend these approaches, resulting in creative hybrid 
solutions to corporate financial distress.42 
Regardless of the approach used, the conventional wisdom is that out-
of-court restructurings require collaboration and consensus among the 
company, its senior lenders, and other stakeholders that must consent to 
the restructuring.43 After all, these are voluntary agreements to deviate 
from bargained-for rights. And this is where things begin to break down 
in practice.44 Big companies typically borrow from large groups of 
 
40. The term “composition” is somewhat antiquated and is more likely to appear in older cases 
and commentary. See, e.g., Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Blake, 37 N.E. 519, 519 (N.Y. 1894) (describing 
a classic composition agreement). 
41. For a critical examination of debt-for-equity swaps, see Jongho Kim, To Be Creditor or to Be 
Shareholder, That Is the Question: Is the Debt-for-Equity Swap Creditors’ Financial Suicide?, 10 J. 
BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 359 (2017). 
42. Companies also increasingly use other transactions to complete out-of-court restructurings, 
such as assignments for the benefit of creditors and Article 9 foreclosure sales under the Uniform 
Commercial Code. See Jim Fleet, Chapter 11 on Decline? Changes Are Here to Stay, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., Mar. 2012, at 16. 
43. This conventional wisdom is reflected in decades of judicial decisions, scholarly articles, 
books, and treatises. See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic Griffin, Facilitating 
Successful Failures, 66 FLA. L. REV. 205, 215 (2014) (“An out-of-court restructuring typically 
involves a consensual agreement between the company and its major creditors to adjust the 
company’s capital structure.”); PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE 
RESTRUCTURINGS 461 (5th ed. 2014) (referring to out-of-court restructurings as “voluntary” and 
“negotiated”); In re Chateaugay Corp., 961 F.2d 378, 381 (2d Cir. 1992) (“A debtor in financial 
trouble may seek to avoid bankruptcy through a consensual out-of-court workout.”).  
44. Describing the somewhat analogous world of bond workouts, Professors Bratton and Levitin 
described these dynamics thusly: 
When a company is in financial distress, its stockholders and bondholders have every reason to 
negotiate a restructuring (or “workout”) of its obligations to produce a sustainable capital 
structure and avoid the costs of a bankruptcy. The reality is different. Bondholders hold out and 
free ride in response to restructuring offers from distressed debtors. Debtors respond with 
coercive inducements and procedural maneuvers. The result is a destabilizing and potentially 
toxic mix of creditor opportunism and debtor coercion that can derail the workout process, 
forcing a bankruptcy restructuring. 
William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, The New Bond Workouts, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1600 
(2018). 
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syndicated lenders.45 These groups—particularly when they enjoy a 
senior secured position in the company’s capital structure—exercise 
enormous bargaining power in setting the terms of any potential 
restructuring. For instance, if the liquidation value is sufficient to pay the 
senior lenders in full, they may prefer an immediate liquidation of the 
firm to reduce any further risk of loss. This is true even if the firm has 
greater value as a going concern. 
Moreover, even if most lenders believe that a consensual restructuring 
makes sense, some may refuse to make concessions in the hopes of 
using their bargaining power to obtain a better deal, either for 
themselves or for the entire group. If the loan agreement requires 
unanimous consent to any modifications, these holdouts may derail the 
entire restructuring; at a minimum, they will certainly make it more 
expensive.46 Accordingly, even when all or most stakeholders agree in 
theory that the firm should be restructured, it may still wind up in 
bankruptcy for lack of consensus.47 
In recent years, in order to help facilitate out-of-court restructurings, 
many commercial loan agreements have included collective action 
clauses48 that allow restructurings with less-than-unanimous consent; 
this helps to prevent opportunistic holdups by lenders holding relatively 
small amounts of debt. For instance, loan agreements commonly allow 
modifications to the agreement with majority or supermajority lender 
consent.49 Such provisions are presumably based on an assumption that 
consent rights will be exercised by lenders organized around a common 
desire to advance the economic interests of all similarly situated lenders. 
This shared economic interest is, in essence, the theoretical justification 
 
45. Syndicated loans are described in BLAISE GANGUIN & JOHN BILARDELLO, FUNDAMENTALS 
OF CORPORATE CREDIT ANALYSIS 161–63 (2005). For a classic practice-oriented treatise on 
syndicated loan agreements, see RICHARD WIGHT, WARREN COOKE & RICHARD GRAY, THE 
LSTA’S COMPLETE CREDIT AGREEMENT GUIDE (2009). 
46. The holdout problem is richly explored in the context of bond debt securities in Marcel 
Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-Off Between Individual and Collective Rights, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1040 (2002). See also Donaldson et al., supra note 31. 
47. See Gilson et al., supra note 4, at 20. 
48. Collective action clauses in the parallel world of sovereign debt are the subject of a rich body 
of academic literature. See, e.g., Jonathan Sedlak, Comment, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: 
Statutory Reform or Contractual Solution?, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1483 (2004) (considering the role of 
collective action clauses in sovereign debt restructurings); Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, 
Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317 (2002) (further examining the role of 
collective action clauses—as well as other contractual solutions and existing civil procedures in the 
U.S.—in facilitating sovereign debt restructurings). 
49. For a practitioner-oriented discussion of consent thresholds in loan agreements, see Suhrud 
Mehta & Lauren Hanrahan, Who’s Calling the Shots?, INT’L. FIN. L. REV., June 2013, at 23. 
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for giving the majority the power to force certain terms down the throats 
of a dissenting minority. 
In this way, minority holdouts are assumed to be at best misguided; at 
worst, they are acting to advance their own self-interest at the expense of 
the majority. Either way, their continued holdout threatens the best 
interests of the entire group, such that forcing them to accept the 
majority-approved restructuring is justified. However, a handful of 
provisions that relate to the lenders’ most important economic rights 
(referred to in industry parlance as “sacred rights”)50 still commonly 
require unanimous consent. These sacred rights include, among other 
things, key economic terms such as the amount of principal outstanding 
and the interest rate applicable to the loan.51 
When a syndicate of senior lenders refuses to consent to an out-of-
court restructuring, either because a majority of lenders declines to see 
the value in restructuring or because the consent thresholds in the 
applicable agreements are too high to overcome the holdouts, corporate 
stakeholders may choose to pursue chapter 11 bankruptcy.52 Bankruptcy 
may also be necessary when there is sufficient senior lender support, but 
the broader restructuring plan requires other interventions that can only 
be obtained through a bankruptcy proceeding.53 The following section 
provides a brief overview of these in-court restructurings. 
B. The Conventional Wisdom of Bankruptcy Restructurings 
Given the obstacles to achieving out-of-court restructurings, a legal 
solution to corporate financial distress is needed to ensure that 
companies can be liquidated in an orderly manner or rehabilitated to 
preserve going concern value. Over the years, a variety of formal and 
informal state and federal insolvency regimes have been developed to 
 
50. For a practitioner-oriented discussion of sacred rights, see Kristina L. Anderson, The Skinny 




52. Most bankruptcy filings are made after weeks or months of out-of-court restructuring 
discussions. See, e.g., Peg Brickley & Tom Corrigan, Breitburn Energy Partners Files for Chapter 
11 Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. (May 16, 2016, 5:32 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/breitburn-
energy-partners-files-for-chapter-11-bankruptcy-1463400009 (last visited Nov. 2, 2021) (describing 
the company’s monthlong negotiations with creditors prior to filing for bankruptcy protection). 
53. For instance, bankruptcy allows debtors to reject leases and other executory contracts. See 11 
U.S.C. § 365. For a discussion of the common scenarios that tend to favor bankruptcy, see 
Duberstein, supra note 32, at 351–54. 
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address this need.54 It would be impossible to review all of them here; 
accordingly, this section focuses on modern bankruptcy reorganizations 
proceeding under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Through chapter 11, bankruptcy offers a legal framework to help shift 
some bargaining power to the debtor, neutralize the holdout risk, and 
provide a limited pathway for nonconsensual restructurings. And, while 
bankruptcy law provides a range of protections for secured creditors, it 
also helps to recenter restructuring discussions around enhancing the 
company’s long-term prospects as a going concern, thereby theoretically 
maximizing the potential recoveries of all stakeholders rather than those 
in positions of control. 
Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, two important legal events 
immediately take place. First, a bankruptcy estate is created, composed 
primarily of property in which the debtor had an interest prior to the 
bankruptcy filing.55 Second, an automatic stay goes into effect, 
protecting the debtor and property of the estate from further collection 
efforts or enforcement actions by creditors (and almost everyone else, 
for that matter).56 Collectively, these two mechanisms prevent the 
quintessential “race to the courthouse” that might occur outside of 
bankruptcy, as self-interested creditors rush to collect what they are 
owed before others seize any remaining value.57 
In most chapter 11 cases, there is no trustee appointed to oversee the 
estate; instead, the debtor continues to make decisions in respect of its 
property—within certain legal parameters—as a “debtor in 
possession.”58 For instance, the debtor may use, sell, or lease property of 
the estate in the ordinary course of business without notice to others or a 
judicial hearing.59 In order to use, sell, or lease property of the estate 
outside of the ordinary course of business, the debtor must provide 
notice and attend a hearing where other stakeholders may appear and 
voice objections.60 In evaluating requests of this sort, bankruptcy courts 
 
54. The various historical and present-day regimes are richly explored elsewhere. See, e.g., 
DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2003) 
(providing a thorough historical account of the evolution of U.S. bankruptcy laws, focusing on how 
political and economic forces helped shape the legal regime). 
55. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). 
56. Id. § 362. 
57. This fundamental goal of bankruptcy law is concisely explained in Mark J. Roe, Three Ages 
of Bankruptcy, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 187, 191–92 (2017). 
58. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1108. Unless the context suggests otherwise, I use the term “debtor” to 
refer to the debtor-in-possession. 
59. Id. § 363(c)(1). 
60. Id. § 363(b)(1). 
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typically grant considerable deference to the debtor’s business judgment. 
Meanwhile, the debtor is expected to work towards a confirmable 
plan of reorganization. The Bankruptcy Code gives the debtor the 
exclusive right to propose a plan for the first 120 days of the case, with 
extensions commonly requested and granted.61 Increasingly, debtors 
enter chapter 11 with some or even all of the critical pieces of a plan 
already in place—either in the form of a prepackaged or prenegotiated 
plan, or in the form of a support agreement in which major stakeholders 
commit in advance to support a plan that meets certain general or 
specific parameters.62 A bankruptcy plan may contemplate using the 
same restructuring techniques that are used out of court; and, much like 
out-of-court restructurings, bankruptcy plans may blend together 
multiple techniques into sophisticated hybrid plans. Meanwhile, the 
debtor is also expected to review its executory contracts and unexpired 
leases and determine, generally, whether to assume, reject, or attempt to 
renegotiate these agreements for better terms.63 
Collectively, these rules afford the bankrupt company some breathing 
room to reflect on the business and determine next steps. And, to the 
extent they place the debtor in the driver’s seat for the most important 
restructuring decisions, they also shift some of the bargaining power 
back to the debtor. Of course, modern commercial realities undercut 
these dynamics somewhat. For instance, business debtors typically enter 
bankruptcy in dire need of cash to finance operations and pay for goods 
and services. If—as is very often the case—all of the company’s cash is 
subject to security interests, it constitutes “cash collateral” and cannot be 
used without the consent of the secured party or express permission of 
the court.64 
If the debtor cannot obtain permission to use cash collateral, or if the 
amount of available cash is insufficient, the debtor may need to obtain 
financing on a post-petition basis.65 These so-called “DIP loans”—which 
are often extended by the debtor’s most powerful stakeholders—tend to 
include highly restrictive covenants that bind the company to certain 
 
61. Id. § 1121. 
62. For more on agreements of this sort, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Distorted Choice in Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 130 YALE L.J. 366 (2020); Edward J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin, Badges of 
Opportunism: Principles for Policing Restructuring Support Agreements, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. 
& COM. L. 169 (2018); and Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
593 (2017). 
63. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). 
64. Id. § 363(c). 
65. Id. § 364. 
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restructuring decisions and timelines.66 DIP loans are also typically 
extended on a super-priority basis, meaning that they have the right to be 
repaid before most other claims.67 In light of these and other aspects of 
modern chapter 11 practice, many argue that senior lenders68—
including, in particular, DIP lenders69—have far too much power over 
bankruptcy restructurings. 
But while chapter 11’s modern-day impacts on bargaining power may 
be debated, the Bankruptcy Code’s ability to neutralize the holdout risk 
is much clearer. Because bankruptcy restructuring is typically an 
exercise in scarcity, most plans contemplate impairment of some claims 
and interests. In accordance with bankruptcy’s default distributional rule 
of absolute priority,70 value flows downward, with senior classes entitled 
to be paid in full before junior classes receive anything.71 To this end, 
the plan organizes creditors and interest holders into classes based on the 
nature of the claim or interest,72 ranked in terms of priority.73 
Parties are given detailed information about the plan and the debtor’s 
overall financial condition. Then they are asked to vote on the plan on a 
class-by-class basis. A class is considered to accept the plan if it is 
accepted by creditors holding a majority in number and at least two-
thirds in amount of allowed claims in the class.74 In this way, bankruptcy 
 
66. See generally Frederick Tung, Financing Failure: Bankruptcy Lending, Credit Market 
Conditions, and the Financial Crisis, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 651 (2020). 
67. See 11 U.S.C. § 364(c) (allowing debtors to incur debts with priority over any or all 
administrative expenses). 
68.  See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, The “New and Improved” Chapter 11, 93 KY. L.J. 839 (2005) 
(exploring the role of creditor control in modern business bankruptcies); George W. Kuney, 
Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 19 (2004) (considering how secured creditors, in 
particular, exploit certain agency problems that are inherent in chapter 11 bankruptcy); Douglas G. 
Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673 (2003) (emphasizing 
that creditor control is a pervasive feature of chapter 11). 
69.  I explore the effects of DIP loans on power dynamics in Diane Lourdes Dick, The Bearish 
Bankruptcy, 52 GA. L. REV. 437 (2018).  
70. Although absolute priority remains the default distributional norm in bankruptcy, Professor 
Baird has made a strong case for replacing it with a norm of “relative priority.” See Baird, supra 
note 29. 
71. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (providing that a plan may be confirmed over the objections of 
impaired parties if it is “fair and equitable,” meaning that holders of claims and interests are either 
paid in full or that no junior stakeholders receive a distribution). 
72. Id. § 1122. 
73. To the extent lenders have entered into intercreditor agreements that restrict the extent to 
which they can participate in the debtor’s eventual bankruptcy, courts have struggled with the 
question of whether such agreements are enforceable in bankruptcy. For a rich discussion, see 
Edward R. Morrison, Rules of Thumb for Intercreditor Agreements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 721. 
74. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c). A similar rule applies to classes of equity interests. Id. § 1126(d). 
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law is able to override the higher consent thresholds—including 
requirements of unanimous consent—that would have applied to an out-
of-court restructuring. 
This power to bind holdouts within each class of claims or interests is 
a significant feature of bankruptcy law. There are, however, important 
safeguards in place for dissenting parties. For instance, the plan must 
provide the same treatment for all claims or interests within a class, 
unless the holder agrees to be treated differently.75 This means that 
creditors are generally entitled to be paid on a pro rata basis with other 
similarly-situated creditors. 
Following the vote, the plan proponent must obtain judicial 
confirmation of the plan by making a showing that it complies with a 
long list of requirements laid out in the Bankruptcy Code.76 These 
requirements include, among other things, that the plan has been 
proposed in good faith77 and that the plan is feasible.78 Many plans are 
confirmed on a consensual basis, meaning that each class of claims or 
interests that is impaired has accepted the plan.79 But the Bankruptcy 
Code also provides a mechanism to cram down a plan over the 
objections of one or more dissenting classes.80 As an added check on the 
plan proponent’s power, there must be at least one impaired class of 
claims that has accepted the plan.81 Plan proponents are not permitted to 
engage in class gerrymandering in order to manufacture the required 
consenting class. 
Assuming at least one impaired class has accepted the plan, the 
proponent must show that the plan does not “discriminate unfairly”82 and 
that the plan is “fair and equitable”83 with respect to each dissenting 
class. Most of the objections to a cramdown plan focus on the latter 
 
75. Id. § 1123(a)(4). 
76. Id. § 1129 (which also folds in other requirements, such as those in 11 U.S.C. § 1122 and 
§ 1123).  
77. Id. § 1129(a)(3). The good faith standard is “generally interpreted to mean that there exists ‘a 
reasonable likelihood that the plan will achieve a result consistent with the objectives and purposes 
of the Bankruptcy Code.’” In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 425 (7th Cir. 1984) (citation 
omitted). 
78. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11). 
79. Id. § 1129(a)(8). 
80. Id. § 1129(b). 
81. Id. § 1129(a)(10). 
82. Id. § 1129(b)(1). Unfair discrimination is a murky concept that generally means that the 
debtor has treated a class differently than another class without any reasonable basis. See, e.g., id. 
§ 1322 (laying out a similar standard for a chapter 13 plan). 
83. Id. § 1129(b)(1). 
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requirement, which is considered by many to be the most essential 
creditor safeguard in the Bankruptcy Code.84 Generally speaking, a plan 
is fair and equitable with respect to a dissenting class if it provides at 
least as much as the class would have been entitled to receive in a 
hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation, and no junior holder receives 
anything on account of their claim or interest.85 With respect to secured 
creditors, who hold property interests that even federal bankruptcy law 
cannot undermine, the standard is generally construed to mean that they 
retain their lien and receive deferred cash payments with a present value 
equal to or greater than the value of their collateral.86 
Proving that the fair and equitable standard has been met can be 
difficult; it requires expert testimony establishing the likely liquidation 
value of the firm as well as the present value of the firm as a going 
concern.87 Because bankruptcy law is concerned with the income-
generating potential of the reorganized firm, going concern value is 
primarily measured using the discounted cash flow method.88 Like all 
exercises in corporate valuations, these reports are expensive and time-
consuming, and they rely on qualitative inputs from the company.89 For 
this reason, the threat of cramdown is often enough to bring parties back 
to the negotiation table to reach a consensual plan. 
By restoring some bargaining power to the debtor, neutralizing the 
holdout risk, and providing a pathway for a nonconsensual restructuring, 
bankruptcy is traditionally viewed as a legal process that helps parties 
achieve restructurings that they would not have been able to achieve on 
an out-of-court basis. And, in so doing, it recenters all parties’ focus on 
the company’s long-term prospects as a going concern. This arguably 
helps to maximize the recoveries of all stakeholders. 
Of course, as this summary of chapter 11 has revealed, there are 
 
84. In a dissenting Third Circuit opinion, Judge Ambro highlighted the importance of the “fair 
and equitable” standard: “Instead of the court-determined standard of the prior Bankruptcy Act, the 
Bankruptcy Code created stronger creditor safeguards and protections in § 1129(b)(2)(A).” In re 
Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 335 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting); see also 
Anthony L. Miscioscia, Jr., The Bankruptcy Code and the New Value Doctrine: An Examination 
into History, Illusions, and the Need for Competitive Bidding, 79 VA. L. REV. 917, 919 (1993) (“If 
applied rigorously [the cramdown rules] provide[] creditors with a strong leverage device for use in 
negotiating reorganization plans.”). 
85. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2). 
86. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A). 
87. These valuation reports are the subject of IAN RATNER, GRANT T. STEIN & JOHN C. 
WEITNAUER, BUSINESS VALUATION AND BANKRUPTCY (2009). 
88. Id. at 39–58. 
89. I explore these and related issues in Diane Lourdes Dick, Valuation in Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy: The Dangers of an Implicit Market Test, 2017 ILL. L. REV. 1487. 
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numerous statutory requirements that must be satisfied, and bankruptcy 
involves many trips to the courthouse. Other parties—including the 
smallest stakeholders—may intervene, introducing high levels of 
uncertainty. Even where there appears to be consensus among the 
parties, the judge90 or the U.S. Trustee91 may object to the debtor’s 
proposals. Accordingly, it should be no surprise that bankruptcy comes 
with significant costs.92 These costs can be further divided into direct 
and indirect costs, with the former category including professional fees 
and other expenses and the latter category including various opportunity 
costs, such as reputational damage.93 
For these reasons, bankruptcy is often viewed as the nuclear option, to 
be avoided at all costs.94 Under the conventional wisdom, these realities 
ought to encourage parties to work harder to collaborate and reach 
consensual out-of-court restructurings. As the following section reveals, 
this is not the case anymore. Instead, debtor companies increasingly 
pursue hostile restructurings, allowing them to achieve many of the 
benefits of a bankruptcy restructuring without all of the risks, costs, or 
creditor safeguards. 
II. THE RISE OF HOSTILE OUT-OF-COURT RESTRUCTURINGS 
This Part examines a series of illustrative examples of hostile 
restructurings. The analysis is divided into two sections, each focusing 
on a commonly utilized transaction structure. The first section explores 
“uptiering”95 transactions involving the extension of new, senior 
tranches of debt. Drawing from restructuring transactions recently 
pursued by Serta, Inc., and NYDJ Apparel, LLC, this section shows how 
 
90. Bankruptcy judges possess broad equitable and discretionary powers; they are also expected 
to manage cases in ways that produce quick and efficient outcomes. These complex and, at times, 
conflicting responsibilities are richly explored in Melissa B. Jacoby, What Should Judges Do in 
Chapter 11?, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 572; Melissa B. Jacoby, Fast, Cheap, and Creditor-Controlled: 
Is Corporate Reorganization Failing?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 401, 427–33 (2006). 
91. The role of the U.S. Trustee is thoughtfully explored in Lindsey D. Simon, The Guardian 
Trustee in Bankruptcy Courts and Beyond, 98 N.C. L. REV. 1297 (2020). 
92. For a comprehensive discussion of bankruptcy costs, see EDWARD I. ALTMAN & EDITH 
HOTCHKISS, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND BANKRUPTCY: PREDICT AND AVOID 
BANKRUPTCY, ANALYZE AND INVEST IN DISTRESSED DEBT 71–81 (4th ed. 2019). 
93. Id. at 93. 
94. See, e.g., Richard Danielson, The Nuclear Option: Clearwater Condo Owners Push Back 
Against Bond Debt, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 28, 2019), https://www.tampabay.com/business/the-
nuclear-option-clearwater-condo-owners-push-back-against-bond-debt-20190628/ 
[https://perma.cc/SMV4-ZBZW] (referring to a bankruptcy filing as a “nuclear option”). 
95. The term is used in LSTA Presentation, supra note 12. 
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these new priming debt issuances are often the product of secretive and 
divisive negotiations orchestrated by the company. The second section 
explores the “dropdown”96 maneuver to transfer the most valuable 
collateral out of the reach of lenders so that it may be used to secure new 
debt issuances. Drawing from such prominent examples as J. Crew 
Group, Inc. and Revlon, Inc., this section reveals just how contentious 
hostile restructurings can be. 
A. Uptiering Restructuring Transactions 
In hostile restructurings that use the uptiering transaction structure, 
the company issues new super-priority debt. These new extensions of 
credit typically roll up the loans of some of the existing lenders, 
essentially resulting in an intra-class subordination of some of the senior 
debt. For instance, the privately-owned U.S. bedding manufacturer 
Serta, Inc. (collectively, with its subsidiaries that are party to the 
company’s senior loan agreements, “Serta”)97 recently engaged in a 
transaction of this sort, leading to the subordination of the debts of some 
of its senior secured lenders. 
The story began in 2016, when Serta and its senior lenders entered 
into a syndicated first lien loan agreement.98 This senior secured 
financing arrangement provided the company with $1.95 billion in loans 
(the “First Lien Loans”).99 At the same time, the company and another 
group of lenders established a second lien loan facility providing for 
$450 million in loans.100 As is typically the case in secured financing 
deals structured with first and second lien facilities, each group of 
lenders was separately granted liens on the same collateral—here, 
Serta’s intellectual property and related royalty streams.101 Then, 
pursuant to an intercreditor agreement, the two groups of lenders agreed 
that in the event Serta defaults on its obligations and the lenders must 
exercise their remedies under the agreements (for instance, by 
 
96. The term is also used in LSTA Presentation, supra note 12. 
97. About Serta, SERTA, https://www.serta.com/about [https://perma.cc/H2VB-MZCT]. 
98. Complaint at 11, North Star Debt Holdings, L.P. v. Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC, 
No. 652243/2020, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 4, 2020).  
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Such a lien is enforceable if it is created and attached under U.C.C. § 9-203 (AM. L. INST. & 
UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010). Assuming the secured party is the first to perfect a security interest in the 
collateral, it will be entitled, after the borrower’s default, to collect against the value of the collateral 
before competing lienholders’ claims are satisfied. See U.C.C. § 9-322(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. 
COMM’N 2010). 
Lourdes-Dick (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2021  9:47 PM 
2021] HOSTILE RESTRUCTURINGS 1353 
 
foreclosing on collateral), the obligations arising under the First Lien 
Loans must be satisfied in full before lenders holding second lien loans 
are entitled to recover. 
To ensure that the proceeds of any such disposition of collateral are 
distributed fairly to lenders within each tranche, the loan agreement also 
contained a fairly standard payment waterfall provision102 entitling each 
lender (after certain expenses and entitled reimbursements are paid) to a 
pro rata share of any proceeds of the collateral, based on the face amount 
of loans that each lender owns.103 This means that, within each tranche, 
no lender would have a superior right to the value of the collateral over 
any other lender. As further evidence of the lenders’ commitment to 
proportional sharing of proceeds, the loan agreement provided that to the 
extent any lender receives payment on account of its loans that is of a 
greater proportion than that received by others, the surplus must be 
shared ratably among the lenders within that tranche.104 
Serta’s loan agreement generally provided that it may be amended 
with the consent of the “Required Lenders,” a term defined to mean 
lenders holding more than 50% of the face value of the loans.105 
Meanwhile, sacred rights could only be amended with “the consent of 
each Lender directly and adversely affected thereby.”106 This unanimous 
consent requirement applied to, among other things, the amendment of 
critical economic terms, such as the outstanding principal amount, the 
interest rate, and the maturity date.107 It also applied to amendments to 
the waterfall provision requiring pro rata sharing of any proceeds of 
collateral.108 But not every transaction in which a lender receives value 
 
102. The Third Circuit recently explained how provisions of this sort function. See In re Energy 
Future Holdings Corp., 773 F. App’x 89, 91 (3d Cir. 2019) (“A waterfall provision sets the order in 
which parties will receive benefits from an asset pool.”). 
103. For the relevant excerpts from the loan agreement, see Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Their Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, a Preliminary Injunction, and 
Expedited Discovery, Exhibit B, Serta, No. 652243/2020, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4222 
[hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Memorandum Exhibit B]. Section 2.18(b) contains the payment waterfall. 
That section provides that after certain expenses are paid, the proceeds of collateral are to be divided 
pro rata among the first lien lenders, based on the face amount of their ownership of loans. This 
means that all first lien lenders would share the proceeds based on the percentage of the loans that 
they own. See Complaint, supra note 98, at 15. 
104. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum Exhibit B, supra note 103, at 76–77 (reprinting 
section 2.18(c)). 
105. Lender Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Application for a 
Temporary Restraining Order, a Preliminary Injunction, and Expedited Discovery at 7, Serta, 
No. 652243/2020, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4222 [hereinafter Defendants’ Memorandum]. 
106. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum Exhibit B, supra note 103, at 137 (reprinting section 9.02(b)(A)). 
107. Id. at 137–38 (reprinting sections 9.02(b)(A)(1)–(6)). 
108. Id. at 138 (reprinting section 9.02(b)(A)(6)). 
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on account of its debt position would be subject to the pro rata sharing 
requirement. In carveout language, the agreement provided that consent 
was not required for debt-to-debt exchanges on a non-pro rata basis that 
take place pursuant to an open market transaction,109 even if Serta is the 
one purchasing the debt.110 
In the years following Serta’s entry into the loan agreement, the 
company’s financial condition worsened. The company faced increased 
competition from new direct-to-consumer mattress brands.111 It also 
faced mounting pressure as one of its largest retail partners filed for 
bankruptcy protection.112 By early 2020, with the global COVID-19 
pandemic threatening another recession, Serta found it increasingly 
difficult to manage the risks and consequences of a highly leveraged 
balance sheet. Although management continued to offer assurances that 
the company was on solid footing, rating agencies slashed Serta’s ratings 
to junk.113 By June, the First Lien Loans were trading at less than fifty 
cents on the dollar, while the second lien loans were trading at less than 
twenty cents on the dollar.114 
To enhance the firm’s balance sheet and improve liquidity, Serta 
commenced negotiations with various groups of existing lenders to 
restructure the senior secured debt. This was no small undertaking; at the 
time, there was over $2 billion in debt still outstanding under the senior 
secured facility. The company’s board of directors formed a special 
finance committee of independent directors to consider and evaluate 
proposals.115 Serta entered into confidentiality agreements with several 
lender groups, binding them to “no-talk”116 provisions that would 
prevent them from disclosing the terms of a potential deal to other 
lenders and potentially coordinating with each other to the detriment of 
 
109. Id. at 149 (reprinting section 9.05(g)). The term “affiliated lender” is defined elsewhere in 
the agreement to include Serta. See Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 105, at 12.  
110. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum Exhibit B, supra note 103, at 77 (reprinting 
section 2.18(c)(ii)(B), which carves out the proceeds of an assignment or sale of loans pursuant to 
section 9.05 from the pro rata sharing provision). 
111. Affidavit of Allen Barry Canipe at 2, Serta, No. 652243/2020, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4222 
[hereinafter Canipe Affidavit]. 
112. See Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, In re Mattress Firm, Inc., 
No. 18-12241-CSS (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 24, 2020). 
113. Complaint, supra note 98, at 16. 
114. Affirmation of Jennifer L. Conn in Support of Lender Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ 
Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, a Preliminary Injunction, and Expedited Discovery, 
Exhibit 2, Serta, No. 652243/2020, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4222. 
115. These efforts are described more fully in the Canipe Affidavit, supra note 111. 
116. Such provisions, and the closely related “no-shop” provisions, are the subject of Karl F. 
Balz, No-Shop Clauses, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 513 (2003). 
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Serta.117 
Serta would later characterize these negotiations as a “competitive 
process between competing lender groups” conducted in good faith.118 
Through this process, two lead proposals emerged: the first, advanced by 
lenders holding a slim majority of the First Lien Loans, contemplated a 
new super-priority debt facility consisting of the participating lenders’ 
loans, which would prime all of the existing tranches under the senior 
secured facility.119 The other, proposed by a group of lenders holding 
approximately 30% of the First Lien Loans, contemplated the transfer of 
the most valuable collateral away from the lenders under the senior 
secured facility so that it could be used to secure the participating 
lenders’ loans.120 Each proposal provided much-needed access to new 
credit; each was also an exclusive deal, meaning that lender participation 
would be limited to those lenders involved in the negotiations. 
Serta—acting through its special finance committee—chose the 
former proposal over the latter, and in June 2020 the company 
announced that it had reached a deal that would reduce the company’s 
overall debt burden by approximately $400 million.121 The restructuring 
would unfold as follows. First, lenders holding 50.1% of the First Lien 
Loans122 would fund $200 million in new First Lien Loan debt.123 Then, 
the company would conduct a debt-to-debt exchange on a non-pro rata 
basis with these participating lenders, pursuant to which the lenders 
would swap, at a discount,124 their First Lien Loans (including the 
 
117. Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ 
Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, a Preliminary Injunction, and Expedited Discovery 
at 5, Serta, No. 652243/2020, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4222 [hereinafter Serta’s Memorandum]. 
118. Id. at 1. 
119. This structure had been used by other companies in recent years. See, e.g., CPI Card Group 
Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 15 (Apr. 23, 2020) (describing an uptiering transaction 
effectuated in March 2020); Fusion Connect, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 10, 2019) 
(describing an uptiering transaction effectuated in May 2019); McDermott International, Inc., 
Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 17, 2019) (describing an uptiering transaction effectuated in 
October 2019). 
120. This structure is described in more detail infra section II.B.  
121. Press Release, Serta, Inc., Serta Simmons Bedding Enters into Agreement with Majority of 
Lenders on Deleveraging and Liquidity Enhancing Transaction (June 8, 2020), 
https://sertasimmons.com/news/serta-simmons-bedding-enters-into-agreement-with-majority-of-
lenders-on-deleveraging-and-liquidity-enhancing-transaction/ [https://perma.cc/C6TM-C5AM] 
[hereinafter Serta Press Release]. 
122. Serta’s Memorandum, supra note 117, at 6. 
123. See Serta Press Release, supra note 121. Loan agreements typically allow the company to 
issue to debt under certain circumstances. 
124. The company would provide seventy-four cents of new loans in exchange for each dollar of 
existing first lien loans. Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 105, at 12. 
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$200 million in new loans) for loans issued under a new credit facility.125 
Next, the participating lenders would use their majority power to execute 
a series of amendments to the 2016 loan agreement that would give the 
new loan facility senior payment priority. Finally, the parties would 
execute an intercreditor agreement establishing the payment priorities 
for the new facility.126 
Once these steps were completed, the proposed credit facility would 
include the $200 million in new loans, which would prime all of the 
other debt (called a super-priority “first out” in industry parlance).127 
Next, there would be a $875 million debt facility (known as a “second 
out” tranche) consisting of the debt exchanged by the participating 
lenders.128 Last, the agreement contemplated an unspecified amount of 
“third out” debt that would potentially arise in the future.129 And, 
pursuant to the amendments to the 2016 loan agreement, all tranches of 
the new facility would rank ahead of the First Lien Loans. In other 
words, following the consummation of these transactions, there would 
be more than $1 billion in debt that would have priority over the 
$814 million remaining First Lien Loans owned by the lenders who were 
not invited to participate in the restructuring. 
Unwilling to accept this fate, the lenders who advanced the losing 
proposal filed suit in a New York state court against Serta, its private 
equity owner, and the lenders participating in the restructuring.130 The 
plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the restructuring amounted to 
a breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing.131 Given that time was of the essence, the aggrieved 
lenders asked the court to impose a preliminary injunction132 and 
 
125. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum Exhibit B, supra note 103, at 149 (reprinting section 9.05(g)). The 
language does not expressly prohibit exclusive deals. 
126. Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 105, at 18. 
127. See Serta Press Release, supra note 121. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. See generally Complaint, supra note 98 (initiating the lawsuit). 
131. There is a covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract. See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 205 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (providing a concise restatement of 
the prevailing U.S. common law concerning the duty of good faith and fair dealing); U.C.C. § 1-304 
(AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (setting forth the duty of good faith applicable to contracts 
and duties arising under the Uniform Commercial Code). 
132. A preliminary injunction is granted where a plaintiff can demonstrate (1) a likelihood of 
ultimate success on the merits; (2) the prospect of irreparable injury if the provisional relief is 
withheld; and (3) a balance of equities tipping in the moving party’s favor. See Gramercy Co. v. 
Benenson, 223 A.D.2d 497, 498 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 6301, 6313 (CONSOL. 
2021). 
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temporary restraining order133 to enjoin the already-announced 
transactions until a decision could be reached on the merits. 
In their breach of contract claim, the plaintiffs had to overcome 
Serta’s insistence that each individual step of the proposed restructuring 
was permitted under the loan agreement. For instance, the proposed debt 
exchange arguably constituted a permissible open market transaction, 
such that it may take place on a non-pro rata basis.134 Similarly, the 
priming amendment arguably only required majority lender consent.135 
Further bolstering Serta’s case, the loan agreement did not include a 
common provision prohibiting subordination of claims or liens without 
unanimous consent.136 
The plaintiffs, for their part, argued that the overall economic effect 
of the restructuring violated the plain language of the loan agreement 
because such profound changes to the rights of senior secured lenders 
must require unanimous consent.137 For instance, the plaintiffs argued 
that the defendants effectively amended the pro rata sharing clause 
without the consent of all of the lenders.138 In a similar way, the 
plaintiffs insisted that the proposed transaction would have the economic 
effect of releasing substantially all of their collateral, and that any such 
release also requires unanimous consent.139 In essence, they argued that 
the proposed transaction would effectively relegate the plaintiffs to 
unsecured status in clear violation of their sacred rights in the loan 
agreement.140 
The plaintiffs also complained that the company went about the 
restructuring process in a way that violated the lenders’ procedural 
 
133. A temporary restraining order is a remedy that requires the proponent demonstrate (1) a 
likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury absent a restraining order, and (3) a 
balance of equities tipping in its favor. See Silvestre v. De Loaiza, 820 N.Y.S.2d 440, 441 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2006). In Serta, the plaintiffs argued that such relief was necessary because, absent 
intervention by the court, the plaintiffs would suffer “immediate and irreparable injury” from the 
transaction moving forward. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Application 
for a Temporary Restraining Order, a Preliminary Injunction, and Expedited Discovery at 14–20, 
North Star Debt Holdings, L.P. v. Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC, No. 652243/2020, 2020 N.Y. 
Misc. LEXIS 4222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Memorandum]. 
134. This interpretation is based on the provisions in the loan agreement, discussed supra notes 
109 and 110 and accompanying text. 
135. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (describing how amendments to the loan 
agreement generally only require the consent of a majority of the lenders). 
136. Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 105, at 8. 
137. Complaint, supra note 98, at 3–5. 
138. Id. at 5. 
139. Id. at 4. 
140. On sacred rights, see Anderson, supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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rights. Namely, they argued that the exclusive nature of the proposed 
restructuring essentially amounted to an “unlawful scheme to rob certain 
of Serta’s lenders, including Plaintiffs, of their bargained-for 
rights. . .while protecting and providing special benefits to a group of 
favored lenders who agreed to participate in the scheme.”141 Serta, for its 
part, acknowledged the exclusive nature of the deal. But the company 
argued that this was a feature rather than a bug: 
Plaintiffs suggest that they should be permitted to participate in 
the Proposed Transaction, but Plaintiffs’ participation would not 
accomplish the goal of deleveraging the Company. If every First 
Lien Loan lender was permitted to exchange their debt into the 
new facility, there would be no reduction in debt because the 
participating lenders would not be incentivized to sell their debt 
at a discount, whereas now, with the Defendant Lenders, the net 
reduction is nearly $400 million.142 
Then, the company reminded the court that one of the plaintiffs had 
spearheaded a losing restructuring proposal, which would have had 
similar effects on excluded lenders. Serta remarked that this lender must 
know full well that “this is the way restructuring transactions are 
commonly done.”143 
The company also challenged the plaintiffs’ argument that the 
proposed transaction amounted to lien stripping, reminding the court that 
all existing liens would remain in place.144 And, in response to the 
plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief, Serta insisted that there can be no 
irreparable harm because the purported damages have a determinable 
value and each plaintiff can be made whole through an award of money 
damages.145 Thus, even if the court were to accept the plaintiffs’ 
argument that their liens had been effectively stripped, “the liens only 
protect Plaintiffs’ right to be paid money, just as the allegedly 
depreciating value of the loans is measured in dollars and cents. All that 
would be required to make Plaintiffs whole is a simple calculation of the 
value of their debt.”146 Finally, Serta shrugged off concerns about the 
 
141. Complaint, supra note 98, at 3. 
142. Serta’s Memorandum, supra note 117, at 9; see also Affidavit of Roopesh K. Shah at 9, 
North Star Debt Holdings, L.P. v. Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC, No. 652243/2020, 2020 N.Y. 
Misc. LEXIS 4222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Shah Affidavit] (“[T]he fewer holders 
that are offered the opportunity to participate in the debt-for-debt exchange, the more incentivized 
they will be to exchange the debt at a greater discount.”). 
143. Serta’s Memorandum, supra note 117, at 10. 
144. Id. at 12 (“First, no one is stripping Plaintiffs of their liens in the collateral.”) 
145. Id. at 11. 
146. Id. at 12 (emphasis in original). 
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company’s solvency and the minority lenders’ eventual position in any 
future bankruptcy reorganization. These hypothetical concerns were, in 
its view, insufficient grounds for a finding of irreparable harm: 
“Plaintiffs are left claiming a vague harm to their bargaining 
‘leverage.’”147 
Moreover, the company’s advisors maintained that Serta would suffer 
significant and irreparable harm if the proposed transactions were 
enjoined. A financial advisor explained that if the transaction did not go 
forward: 
[Serta’s] lenders will have no incentive to negotiate with [Serta] 
as separate groups, and instead would be incentivized to unite so 
as to obtain the best terms for the lenders, to the detriment of 
[Serta]. As [Serta’s] lenders now know their respective positions 
on a potential refinancing, the lenders have no incentive to 
compete with one another to grant [Serta] favorable terms, but 
rather are incentivized to act as one group.148 
In the financial advisor’s view, the company’s carefully constructed 
“competitive process” offered the only “meaningful opportunity for the 
company to deleverage.”149 
Given the tendency for courts to strictly construe commercial finance 
agreements,150 the weight of the authority was against the plaintiffs. But 
the plaintiffs also alleged that the restructuring breached the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.151 Under basic principles of state 
contract law, every agreement contains an implied duty of good faith and 
fair dealing.152 This is generally understood to mean that parties to 
contracts should behave honestly and work to uphold the spirit of the 
agreement. 
To bolster the latter claim, the plaintiffs reminded the court of a 2018 
decision to deny a motion to dismiss a complaint alleging similar 
conduct.153  The debtor in that case, clothing manufacturer NYDJ 
Apparel, LLC (collectively, with its subsidiaries that are party to the 
company’s senior loan agreements, “NYDJ”), had engaged in an 
uptiering transaction in May 2017 with 53% of lenders from the 
 
147. Id. at 13. 
148. Shah Affidavit, supra note 142, at 8. 
149. Id. 
150. See generally Dick, supra note 14 (discussing courts’ modern reliance on strict interpretation 
of commercial financing agreements). 
151. Complaint, supra note 98, at 23.  
152. See sources cited supra note 131. 
153. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, supra note 133, at 17.  
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company’s senior secured credit facility.154 
The NYDJ plaintiffs—composed of dissenting minority lenders—
argued that the restructuring negotiations were conducted “with no 
notice, under cover of darkness,”155 and that some lenders only learned 
of the proposed transaction when it was publicly announced. One 
plaintiff lender alleged that it had been invited to participate in the 
scheme months earlier but declined to do so because it believed that the 
plan was proposed in bad faith.156 According to this plaintiff, the plan 
proponent had boasted “that the number of lenders benefitting from [the 
scheme] would be kept to the bare minimum necessary to form a 
majority so that the spoils of the scheme could be shared among the 
smallest possible pool of lenders.”157 
At a hearing to address the conflicts surrounding NYDJ’s 
restructuring, the judge seemed to take issue with the secretive nature of 
the negotiations. After parsing through language in the agreement 
establishing consent thresholds for various types of amendments, the 
judge took a moment to reflect on the broader meaning of the words in 
the original agreement. “Doesn’t the phrase written consent imply that 
you’re going to ask everyone to consent?”158 More broadly, he asked, 
“Isn’t there an implied covenant of good faith anymore?”159 When the 
company’s attorneys attempted to redirect the court’s attention to 
language requiring a simple majority, the judge expounded further on 
customary practice and reasonable commercial expectations of good 
faith and fair dealing in this context: 
No, no. I’m not saying they required the written consent of 
every lender. But how do you determine if you have the consent 
of lender A, if you don’t ask lender A would you consent. 
Instead, you have a quote majority, a slight majority, going off 
into a side room and saying we’re going to consent amongst 
ourselves and to hell with the rest of these guys. It really seems 
unethical.160 
 
154. NYDJ, or Can You Really Prime 47% of Lenders Without Their Consent?, KING & 
SPALDING, https://www.kslaw.com/attachments/000/008/524/original/How_did_they_do_it_NYDJ.
pdf?1611586634 [https://perma.cc/726C-4NPG].  
155. Complaint at 5, Octagon Credit Invs., LLC v. NYDJ Apparel, LLC, No. 656677/2017 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Nov. 1, 2017). 
156. Id. at 12–13. 
157. Id. at 12. 
158. Transcript of Proceedings at 22, Octagon Credit Invs., No. 656677/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 
27, 2018). 
159. Id. at 26. 
160. Id. at 23. 
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The aggrieved lenders had advanced a similar interpretation, 
explaining that “the reason you have the class vote is so the majority of 
the class can bind the holdouts that don’t go along with class vote. The 
purpose of the provision isn’t to allow the majority to [improve its own 
position at the expense of] the minority.”161 From that vantage point, it 
was not hard to see that the company’s restructuring proposal violated 
both the language and the spirit of the original loan agreement, as well as 
the most basic conceptions of good faith and fair dealing. For these 
reasons, the court denied the motion to dismiss, opining that the 
plaintiffs had stated a claim for, among other things, breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.162 The parties later 
reached a settlement pursuant to which NYDJ invited all of the lenders 
to exchange their debt at a discounted rate and participate in a new 
facility.163 
Although the dispute surrounding the NYDJ restructuring was similar 
in some respects to the dispute surrounding Serta’s restructuring, there 
were important differences. For one, the plaintiffs opposing Serta’s 
restructuring were far less sympathetic, particularly in their quest for 
equitable relief—in fact, they arguably came to the court with unclean 
hands.164 This is because they had tried to advance their own exclusive 
restructuring plan that, in the words of the defendants, “would have done 
the very thing [the plaintiffs] now accuse[] the Defendant Lenders of 
doing—stripping hundreds of millions of dollars of existing collateral 
away from the other lenders, and placing them . . . in an exclusive 
‘super-priority’ position in the event of default.”165 
Additionally, although NYDJ, like Serta, had insisted that the 
transactions were permitted under the plain language of the loan 
agreement, there was at least some circumstantial evidence in the NYDJ 
restructuring to suggest otherwise. Notably, the company’s law firm, in a 
third-party legal opinion addressing the restructuring agreement’s 
enforceability, expressly declined to opine as to whether the company 
had complied with the consent provisions in the loan agreement.166 
 
161. Id. at 37.  
162. Id. at 43. 
163. See Affirmation, Exhibit B at 13, Octagon Credit Invs., No. 656677/2017. 
164. Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 105, at 1; see also United for Peace & Just. v. 
Bloomberg, 783 N.Y.S.2d 255, 259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (denying a request for an injunction where 
“plaintiff does not come to court with ‘clean hands’”). 
165. Serta’s Memorandum, supra note 117, at 2. 
166. Exhibit G at 7, Octagon Credit Invs., No. 656677/2017 (providing a copy of the legal 
opinion; the relevant qualification is set forth in paragraph (u)). 
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Finally, although the record in the NYDJ dispute was thin with 
respect to the company’s process for vetting proposals, Serta provided 
ample evidence of management’s efforts to comply with their fiduciary 
obligations in evaluating a major transaction. For instance, the company 
had spent nearly a year evaluating multiple strategic alternatives, and 
even retained a law firm and financial advisor to assist with the 
process.167 And, as Serta narrowed down its options to several 
competing proposals, it vested decision-making authority in a committee 
of independent directors.168 These internal processes helped to frame the 
restructuring as a sound exercise of business judgment, and possibly the 
company’s only option to survive a severe economic downturn. 
After initially entering a temporary restraining order to prevent Serta 
from moving forward with the proposed restructuring,169 the court 
declined to grant the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction.170 
This is because, in the court’s view, the plaintiffs had failed to establish 
a likelihood of success on the merits.171 Adopting the company’s 
hypertechnical interpretation, the court explained that it “seems to 
permit[] the debt-to-debt exchange on a non-pro rata basis as part of an 
open market transaction.”172 And, since the amendments did not, in the 
court’s view, impact sacred rights under the loan agreement, unanimous 
consent was not required.173 Serta completed the restructuring in June 
2020.174 
B. Drop-Down Restructuring Transactions 
In hostile restructurings that use the drop-down transaction 
 
167. See generally Affidavit, supra note 142. 
168. Id. at 3.  
169. Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 105, at 13. 
170. Order at 11, North Star Debt Holdings, L.P. v. Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC, 
No. 652243/2020, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 4, 2020).  
171. Id. at 9–10. 
172. Id. at 8.  
173. Id. 
174. Press Release, Serta, Inc., Serta Simmons Bedding Closes Previously Announced 
Deleveraging and Liquidity Enhancing Transaction (June 22, 2020), 
https://sertasimmons.com/news/serta-simmons-bedding-closes-previously-announced-deleveraging-
and-liquidity-enhancing-transaction/ [https://perma.cc/NAX6-YUGJ]. The plaintiffs continued to 
pursue the matter in federal court, but their claims were dismissed in March 2021. Transcript of 
Hearing at 7, Serta, No. 652243/2020, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4222; see also Opinion, LCM XXII 
Ltd. v. Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC, No. 20-cv-5090, at 1–2 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 9, 2021); Complaint, 
LCM XXII Ltd., No. 20-cv-5090. 
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structure,175 companies transfer valuable collateral out of the reach of 
existing lenders in order to secure new debt issuances. This structure was 
infamously used by U.S. apparel retailer J. Crew Group, Inc. 
(collectively, with its subsidiaries that are party to the company’s senior 
loan agreements, “J. Crew”), when, in 2016, certain senior secured 
lenders under a $1.57 billion credit facility claimed to have been 
“shocked and dismayed” to find themselves on the losing end of a drop-
down restructuring.176 
Specifically, the company had transferred certain portions of the 
lenders’ most valuable intellectual property collateral—including the “J. 
Crew” branding—to new, wholly-owned subsidiaries that would not be 
considered debtors or guarantors under the loan agreement.177 At the 
time of the transfer, the intellectual property assets were estimated by J. 
Crew to be worth approximately $250 million,178 while the aggrieved 
lenders would later assert that these assets were worth upwards of $1 
billion.179 Following the transfer, the company promised to redirect $59 
million per year to the new subsidiary to compensate it for the use of the 
intellectual property for branding and merchandising purposes.180 
When they learned of the transfer, the senior secured lenders 
collectively demanded the resignation of the administrative agent181 and 
appointed a new one.182 The company, sensing opposition on the 
horizon, sued the newly-appointed administrative agent for a declaratory 
judgment ratifying the transfers and declaring them permissible under 
the agreement.183 The agent asserted counterclaims, arguing that the 
asset transfer violated the loan agreement and also constituted a 
fraudulent transfer.184 
 
175.  “Drop-down transaction” is an industry term for a restructuring in which the company 
transfers assets to a subsidiary, typically in order to effectuate a sale transaction or to secure debt 
issued by that subsidiary. See generally Scott W. Dolson, Rollover Equity Transactions 2021, 
FROST BROWN TODD LLC (Jan. 28, 2021), https://frostbrowntodd.com/rollover-equity-transactions/ 
[https://perma.cc/4D5G-3JAN].  
176. Complaint at 3, Eaton Vance Mgmt. v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, No. 654397/2017, 
2018 WL 1947405 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 25, 2018). 
177. Id.  
178. Id. at 19. 
179. Affidavit at 13, Eaton Vance Mgmt., No. 654397/2017, 2018 WL 1947405. 
180. Complaint, supra note 176, at 4. 
181. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 19, J. Crew Grp., Inc. v. Wilmington Sav. Fund 
Soc’y, No. 650574/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 1, 2017). 
182. Complaint, supra note 176, at 37. 
183. Complaint, supra note 181, at 19. 
184. Defendant’s Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims at 21–22, J. Crew Grp., Inc. 
v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, No. 650574/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 24, 2017). 
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Specifically, the agent argued that the transfer was part of a 
“multistep process to divert the value of [a] ‘critical’ and ‘integral’ asset 
away from J. Crew Company and its creditors” for the benefit of equity 
owners,185 and that each individual step—much like the transaction as a 
whole—was in violation of the loan agreement. For instance, one of the 
earliest steps in the transaction was the designation of “unrestricted 
subsidiaries.”186 While the agreement contained common language 
allowing the company to make designations of this sort, the company 
could only do so upon a showing that the company was then in 
compliance with certain financial covenants.187 But according to the 
agent, the company’s calculations, as well as certain inputs used to make 
those calculations, were incorrect.188 As a result, the company’s 
designation of the subsidiaries as unrestricted constituted a default under 
the loan agreement.189 The agent also claimed that J. Crew was actually 
insolvent at the time of the transfers, and that the transfers were 
primarily motivated by a desire to drive down the value of the senior 
secured debt so that the company could buy back the loans at a 
discount.190 
J. Crew, for its part, argued that the transactions were permitted under 
the plain language of the loan agreement.191 This is because the 
agreement contained several common carveouts that allowed 
investments by the company in both restricted and unrestricted 
subsidiaries.192 For instance, the agreement allowed investments in 
unrestricted subsidiaries up to certain predetermined thresholds, plus an 
additional amount based on earnings if the company was not in 
default.193 
In June 2017, while the agent’s suit was still pending, the company 
announced the next steps in the drop-down transaction: J. Crew would 
 
185. Id. at 19. 
186. Id. at 20. In typical loan agreements, so-called restricted subsidiaries are subject to 
covenants while unrestricted subsidiaries are not. 
187. Id. at 30–31. 
188. Id. at 31–32. 
189. Id. at 32.  
190. See id. at 51–52. 
191. J. Crew’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Order to Show Cause for Entry 
of a Temporary Restraining Order and for a Preliminary Injunction at 21–22, Eaton Vance Mgmt. v. 
Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, No. 654397/2017, 2018 WL 1947405 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 25, 2018) 
[hereinafter J. Crew’s Memorandum of Law]. 
192. Complaint, supra note 181, at 17–18. The company describes how each step of the 
transaction technically complies with the loan agreement in its Complaint. Id. at 12–14. 
193. Id. at 13. 
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use the new, asset-rich, unrestricted subsidiaries to entice certain junior, 
unsecured bondholders to exchange their debt for new secured bonds of 
lesser principal amount and longer maturities.194 Meanwhile, the 
company solicited senior secured lenders to consent to the transactions, 
direct the agent to drop the lawsuit, and agree to certain amendments to 
the loan agreement.195 To sweeten the proverbial pot, the company 
offered to purchase up to $150 million of the senior secured debt at par 
even though the loans were then trading at seventy cents on the dollar.196 
The lenders were given three days to decide.197 
Lenders who collectively held approximately 88% of the outstanding 
loans voted to accept the restructuring terms.198 Accordingly, the agent 
received a written direction instructing the agent to acknowledge the 
amendments to the loan agreement and dismiss the pending litigation 
once the amendments became effective.199 In a last-ditch effort to stop 
the transaction, minority lenders filed suit in New York state court 
against the company and the agent to enjoin the transactions.200 The 
minority lenders raised, among other things, breach of contract and 
fraudulent conveyance claims.201 
The court denied the minority lenders’ request for a temporary 
restraining order and preliminary injunction.202 In so ruling, the court 
seemed to be most persuaded by the fact that such a large majority of 
lenders consented to the transaction.203 The company and the agent later 
moved to dismiss most of the lenders’ claims on the grounds that the 
Plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief were 
moot.204 Although the minority lenders argued that they should be 
permitted to bring claims when compliance with a no-action clause in 
 
194. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend/Supplement Counterclaims 
at 2, J. Crew Grp., Inc., No. 650574/2017. 
195. See Complaint, supra note 176, at 5. 
196. Id. at 25. 
197. Id. 
198. J. Crew’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 191, at 1. 
199. Stipulation and [Proposed] Order at 2, J. Crew Grp., Inc., No. 650574/2017. 
200. Complaint, supra note 176, at 50–53. 
201. Id. 
202. Transcript at 46–49, Eaton Vance Mgmt. v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, No. 654397/2017, 
2018 WL 1947405 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 25, 2018). 
203. See id. 
204. See, e.g., Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Eaton Vance 
Mgmt., No. 654397/2017, 2018 WL 1947405 (providing further support for the movant’s 
arguments). 
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the agreement would be futile,205 the court declined to embrace this 
argument and granted the motions to dismiss in April 2018.206 The 
minority lenders appealed, but the appellate court upheld the trial court’s 
decision.207 With only one narrow breach of contract claim remaining 
(based on an argument that the transaction required unanimous consent), 
the parties engaged in discovery for over a year before the minority 
lenders finally dropped the suit.208 
Following the company’s legal victories, the drop-down structure has 
come to be known as the “J. Crew” transaction; the term is also used as a 
verb—to be “J. Crewed.”209 But while J. Crew has the dubious 
distinction of setting the deal precedent,210 more recent transactions have 
only upped the ante. Consider the recent restructuring of a $2 billion 
senior secured credit facility by U.S.-based global beauty company 
Revlon, Inc. (collectively, with its subsidiaries that are party to the 
company’s senior loan agreements, “Revlon”).211 The credit facility, 
established in 2016 to finance the acquisition of the Elizabeth Arden 
brand portfolio, was secured by, among other things, Revlon’s most 
valuable intellectual property, including trademarks and other rights 
associated with some of the world’s most well-known beauty brands. 
In August 2019, Revlon commenced a drop-down transaction to 
transfer intellectual property assets to a new subsidiary, beyond the 
reach of the senior secured lenders’ security interests. As in J. Crew, 
these assets were then leased back to the operating subsidiaries so that 
they could continue to use the intellectual property in their business 
activities. Finally, the company used the newly transferred assets to 
secure $200 million in new debt.212 
 
205. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 14, Eaton Vance 
Mgmt., No. 654397/2017, 2018 WL 1947405. 
206. See, e.g., Decision and Order, Eaton Vance Mgmt., No. 654397/2017, 2018 WL 1947405 
(granting the motions to dismiss). 
207. Eaton Vance Mgmt. v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, 99 N.Y.S.3d 28, 28 (App. Div. 2019). 
208. Stipulation of Discontinuance, Eaton Vance Mgmt., No. 654397/2017, 2018 WL 1947405. 
209. Peter Coy, In Finance, ‘J. Crew’ Is a Verb. It Means to Stick It to a Lender, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (June 17, 2019, 2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-
17/in-finance-j-crew-is-a-verb-it-means-to-stick-it-to-a-lender [https://perma.cc/AA6R-R3JS]. 
210. Soon after the transaction was completed, one rather prescient observer predicted that 
“[r]ivals who once mimicked the fashionable items on its racks will soon be copying its debt 
restructuring.” Lauren Silva Laughlin, J. Crew Debt Maneuver Can Be a Model for Other Troubled 
Retailers, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/business/
dealbook/jcrew-retailers-debt.html [https://perma.cc/4CHS-ZKEK]. 
211. Our Company, REVLON, https://www.revloninc.com/our-company [https://perma.cc/J9DK-
KB2H].  
212. Jasmine Wu, Revlon Stock Jumps on Report that the Cosmetics Company Is Considering a 
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In the spring of 2020, Revlon proposed repeating the maneuver in a 
transaction that some senior lenders would later argue “siphoned off 
nearly all of the remaining intellectual property” securing the obligations 
owed to them.213 This time around, Revlon proposed issuing nearly $900 
million in new debt, secured by a first-priority lien on the intellectual 
property.214 $200 million of the new debt would be used to pay off the 
debt issued in the smaller J. Crew maneuver that the company had 
previously completed.215 Additionally, the new facility would roll up 
approximately $950 million of debt under the 2016 facility, granting 
these participating lenders second and third priority liens.216 Excluded 
lenders would have no liens at all in the intellectual property. And, while 
they would continue to have liens on the company’s remaining assets, 
their interest would be diluted by a pari passu lien securing the new 
tranches.217 
Under the loan agreement, the transfer of the intellectual property 
collateral, the release of the senior lenders’ liens on such property, and 
the grant of the pari passu lien on the balance of the senior lenders’ 
collateral would all require consent by a majority of the senior secured 
lenders. In an effort to resist the sort of tyranny by a self-interested 
majority that occurred in the Serta restructuring, a group of more than 
50% of the senior lenders “assembled in an effort to protect themselves 
against further theft of their collateral.”218 Specifically, they entered into 
a joint cooperation agreement promising to resist the proposed 
transaction.219 
To overcome this opposition, Revlon exercised its right under the 
loan agreement to issue new, unfunded revolver commitments (later 
described by senior lenders as “not real loans, just empty promises to 
loan”)220: 
[Revlon] took the position that these new “lenders” would then 
be afforded the right to vote (even though they had no economic 
 
Sale, CNBC (Aug. 15, 2019, 4:43 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/15/revlon-stock-jumps-on-
report-it-is-considering-a-sale.html [https://perma.cc/MYQ6-ZGLD]. 
213. Complaint at 4, UMB Bank, Nat’l Assoc. v. Revlon, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-06352 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 12, 2020).  
214. Id. at 5.  
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 49, 58. 
217. Id. at 5. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 6. 
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stake or standing to do so), thereby conjuring up a false majority 
consent for the 2020 Transaction. These fake commitments 
rigged the math: [Revlon] would issue the exact amount of 
commitments necessary to inch over the 50.0% consent 
threshold. The new revolver commitments served no legitimate 
business purpose; rather, they were created solely to manipulate 
and gerrymander voting on the Proposed Amendment so that 
[Revlon] could consummate its scheme to siphon away 
substantially all of the collateral from the 2016 Term Lenders.221 
When the senior secured lenders decried the sham nature of the plan, 
Revlon issued actual debt; of course, within days of its issuance, it 
would be replaced by new loans. In other words, “[t]he revolving loans 
were designed to vote against their own fake interest and to vanish only 
days after being issued.”222 The plan worked, and the new debt issuances 
allowed the amendments to pass “by less than half a percent.”223 
The excluded lenders filed suit in August 2020, raising the same types 
of claims made by lenders in the other case studies: namely, that the 
transactions breached the express provisions of the loan agreement as 
well as the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that the 
asset transfers constituted fraudulent transfers.224 But in a curious twist 
of fate, the lenders’ claims were rendered moot when the administrative 
agent accidentally paid all of the senior secured lenders in full.225 Upon 
discovering the error, the agent issued notices to the lenders, informing 
them that the payments were erroneously made and demanding return of 
the funds. A majority of the lenders refused to return the funds, arguing 
that the amounts paid constituted a valid discharge for value of the 
debt.226 The agent then filed suit against them.227 The case went to trial 
in December 2020228 and the court ruled in February 2021 that the 
 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted). 
223. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
224. Id. 
225. For thoughtful commentary on the accidental payoff and the legal battle it inspired, see 
Jonathan Macey, Schoolyard Justice in Federal Court, WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2021, 12:54 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/schoolyard-justice-in-federal-court-11623171249 
[https://perma.cc/C7SE-RVCM]. 
226. See id. 
227. In re Citibank Aug. 11, 2020 Wire Transfers, 520 F. Supp. 3d 390, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2021). 
228. Jonathan Stempel, Citigroup Urges Return of Mistaken Revlon Payment as Trial Ends, 
REUTERS (Dec. 16, 2020, 10:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/business/legal/citigroup-urges-
return-mistaken-revlon-payment-trial-ends-2020-12-16/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2021). 
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lenders were entitled to keep the sums they received.229 With the debt 
extinguished, the excluded lenders’ lawsuit became irrelevant. 
C. Summary of Case Studies 
The case studies show that the prevailing assumption that out-of-court 
restructurings of senior loans are mostly collaborative and consensual is 
no longer accurate. Nonconsensual restructuring transactions are 
becoming a common feature of the capital markets. These transactions—
which I call “hostile restructurings”—are distinguishable from normal 
out-of-court restructurings by their use of aggressive tactics to overcome 
not only the traditional minority lender holdout problem, but also the 
collective bargaining power of the entire lender group. In other words, in 
hostile restructurings, the goal is not simply to cram a restructuring 
down the throats of a self-interested or misguided minority holdout; 
instead, the goal is to cram a plan down on the entire lender group, 
pitting lenders against one another to achieve restructuring goals that 
benefit the company’s other stakeholders. 
For instance, companies negotiate with multiple lender groups in 
tandem and in secret, even requiring them to promise not to speak to 
their co-lenders about prospective deals. In essence, companies utilize a 
“divide and conquer” strategy230 to dilute the traditional bargaining 
power enjoyed by large senior lender groups.231 These tactics incentivize 
individual lenders or factions to offer enough concessions to the debtor 
to ensure their continued position at the top of the priority ladder. Where 
syndicated lender groups have attempted to reclaim their collective 
bargaining power and band together to defend against hostile 
restructurings, at least one company has subverted the attempt by issuing 
new debt to artificially manufacture the necessary majority.232 
The benefits of hostile restructurings to companies, their other 
stakeholders, and the markets more broadly are clear. Like all debt 
restructurings, hostile restructurings help companies manage fast-
approaching maturities, reduce interest expenses, and relax covenants. 
 
229. In re Citibank, 520 F. Supp. 3d at 451. 
230. For a fascinating discussion of “divide and conquer” as a negotiation strategy, see Larry 
Crump, For the Sake of the Team: Unity and Disunity in a Multiparty Major League Baseball 
Negotiation, 21 NEGOT. J. 317 (2005). 
231. In a classic article exploring bond restructurings, Professor Brudney contrasted the 
negotiation disadvantages faced by dispersed bondholders against the superior bargaining position 
enjoyed by a hypothetical sole lender. See Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondholders and Debtor 
Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1831 (1992). 
232. See supra notes 218–227 and accompanying text. 
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Because they generally feature a debt-for-debt exchange in which 
participating lenders agree to exchange their existing debt for new debt 
at a discount, they help to deleverage troubled companies, in some cases 
helping to preserve solvency and stave off bankruptcy. 
These transactions also offer cash-strapped companies relatively 
quick access to much-needed liquidity on an out-of-court basis. And, to 
the extent they include additional borrowing capacity that may be used 
for future debt buy-backs, transactions of this sort allow companies to 
take advantage of lower market prices of their own debt as they continue 
to deleverage. Finally, like all successful restructurings, hostile 
restructurings have the potential to stabilize and preserve valuable and 
productive business enterprises, advancing the interests of employees, 
shareholders, and the countless suppliers, vendors, and other parties that 
conduct business with the company. 
Hostile restructurings may also enhance the overall efficiency of the 
market for corporate debt restructuring. For instance, in a play on the 
classic prisoner’s dilemma,233 if lenders are aware that companies 
regularly pursue hostile restructurings that only benefit some lenders at 
the expense of others, they may be more inclined to agree to a debtor’s 
initial restructuring proposal in order to ensure that they are not on the 
losing end of a hostile restructuring.234 In other words, the threat of 
hostile restructurings may help to counterbalance the economic 
incentives for lenders to collectively refuse to make concessions or 
engage in strategic holdout behavior. A more competitive market for 
out-of-court restructurings may, in turn, enhance firm value by allowing 
firms to reconfigure their capital structure more quickly and efficiently 
in distressed situations. 
But hostile restructurings also introduce considerable uncertainty and, 
accordingly, carry substantial litigation costs. Although the companies 
promoting these transactions often claim that they do not technically 
violate existing agreements, hostile restructurings tend to proceed under 
strained interpretations of highly technical language, at the same time 
 
233. Judge Easterbrook described the classic prisoners’ dilemma: 
Two prisoners, unable to confer with one another, must decide whether to take the prosecutor’s 
offer: confess, inculpate the other, and serve a year in jail, or keep silent and serve five years. If 
the prisoners could make a (binding) bargain with each other, they would keep silent and both 
would go free. But they can’t communicate, and each fears that the other will talk. So both 
confess. 
Page v. United States, 884 F.2d 300, 301 (7th Cir. 1989). 
234. This is a spin on the classic argument that hostile takeovers enhance market efficiency 
through a disciplinary effect. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper 
Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981). 
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implicating thorny and fact-intensive legal and equitable doctrines, such 
as the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and fraudulent 
transfer laws. Despite these costs and uncertainties, aggrieved and 
dissenting lenders have every incentive to engage in extensive litigation. 
After all, hostile restructurings delve a harsh blow to excluded lenders, 
who lose valuable collateral and/or their priority status on future 
repayment. 
And while these are the most obvious direct costs, there are also a 
number of indirect costs. Hostile restructurings have the potential to 
destroy value, impair the smooth functioning of the capital markets, and 
introduce and amplify the distributional concerns that have traditionally 
plagued bankruptcy restructurings. The following Part considers these 
indirect costs, arguing that hostile restructurings constitute a normative 
failure in the capital markets. 
III. HOSTILE OUT-OF-COURT LOAN RESTRUCTURINGS AS A 
NORMATIVE FAILURE 
The previous Part highlighted some of the more immediate risks and 
benefits of hostile restructurings. This Part takes a closer look, 
concluding that the rise of hostile restructurings should be understood as 
a normative failure in the U.S. capital markets.235 This is because these 
transactions violate the most fundamental norms and values underlying 
commercial law and practice. First, hostile restructurings threaten the 
important goals of legal certainty and predictability in the capital 
markets. Second, they violate classic and emerging theoretical 
justifications for nonconsensual adjustments to loan agreements. Finally, 
these transactions have the potential to interfere with the smooth 
functioning of the capital markets, causing counterproductive outcomes 
and other dangerous ripple effects. Moreover, these problems are 
unlikely to self-correct; in fact, they are likely to become worse over 
time. 
A. Hostile Restructurings Threaten Legal Certainty and Predictability 
in the Capital Markets 
Hostile restructurings threaten the important goals of legal certainty 
and predictability in the capital markets by undermining investor 
confidence in payment priority and lien rights.236 Priority—whether in 
 
235. Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947 (1997). 
236. The unique role of the lien—as opposed to other property rights and entitlements—in 
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respect of payment or lien rights—is always a concern to lenders. But in 
times of economic uncertainty and corporate financial distress, it is a far 
more pressing concern. This is because in the event of a future 
bankruptcy filing, distribution rights are typically determined in 
accordance with absolute priority.237 
Through private ordering, the grant of consensual liens, and the grant 
of lien and payment priority, debtors exercise their rights “to prefer some 
creditors over others.”238 Under the common law, these sorts of 
preferences were viewed as a fraud on other creditors.239 As a classic 
work explained, “When a debtor grants a security interest to one of his 
creditors, he increases the riskiness of other creditors’ claims by 
reducing their expected value in bankruptcy.”240 But modern commercial 
law accepts these risks on the grounds that they are counterbalanced by 
the voluntary nature of most commercial transactions: after all, 
subsequent creditors have an opportunity to conduct due diligence and 
identify prior liens. As Professors Jackson and Kronman explained: 
“[T]hese other creditors will be aware of this risk and will insist on a 
premium for lending on an unsecured basis, will demand collateral (or 
some other protection) to secure their own claims, or will search for 
another borrower whose enterprise is less risky.”241 
Another classic work defended consensual liens based on a 
“normative theory of security interests [that] is grounded upon the 
normative theories that justify the institution of property. The right to 
own private property is the essential bedrock of capitalism and an 
essential component of a market economy.”242 In other words, a lien is 
one of the many sticks in the proverbial bundle that represent rights in 
private property, and owners are free to distribute those sticks as they 
see fit. “[I]nsofar as any . . . adverse effects on existing and future 
unsecured creditors are concerned, the transfer of a security interest does 
 
modern corporate finance is richly explored in Ofer Eldar & Andrew Verstein, The Enduring 
Distinction Between Business Entities and Security Interests, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 213 (2019). 
237. See supra notes 70–71. 
238. Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among 
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1147–48 (1979). 
239. See, e.g., Clow v. Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 275, 284 (Pa. 1819) (“The mortgage of a chattel 
is a pledge; that to such pledge a delivery of the chattel is necessary, and that every such mortgage, 
where the parties stand in the relation of debtor and creditor, unaccompanied with such possession 
as the subject-matter is capable of, is fraudulent and void against all other creditors . . . .”). 
240. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 238, at 1147. 
241. Id. at 1148. 
242. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: 
Taking Debtors’ Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2047–48 (1994). 
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not differ fundamentally from other transfers of a property interest in 
exchange for equivalent value.”243 
Subsequent works have challenged these and other traditional 
justifications for consensual liens, but almost entirely from the 
perspective of unsecured creditors244 and involuntary creditors, such as 
tort claimants and other lien creditors.245 But hostile restructurings do 
not implicate these familiar concerns over the ability for unsecured 
creditors to eventually collect from debtors that have granted consensual 
liens to their other creditors. Instead, hostile restructurings raise a 
different question: whether a company can prefer some of its existing 
senior secured creditors over others. In other words, hostile 
restructurings implicate questions of intra-class subordination among 
creditors that were previously given the same stick to share. 
Here, the law, customary practice, and economic realities all suggest 
that this conduct should not be allowed. While debtor companies may 
argue that hostile restructurings do not, as a technical matter, impair the 
rights of the excluded lenders, they clearly change the economic 
substance of the arrangement. And this may be all it takes to undermine 
investor confidence in payment priority and lien rights. Changes to 
payment priority impact a creditor’s relative position in the bankruptcy 
distribution scheme, while new pari passu debt issuances dilute each 
lender’s pro rata distribution. Moreover, claims in bankruptcy are treated 
as secured only to the value of the collateral properly securing those 
obligations.246 If the most valuable property has been transferred out of 
the collateral pool, or if all of the collateral value is consumed by new, 
higher-priority debt issuances, then the lenders’ claims will be 
effectively relegated to unsecured status.247 
Of course, some market participants would argue that these are 
 
243. Id. at 2052.  
244. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887 (1994). 
245. See id.; see also Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 
Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373 (1997). 
246. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a claim is treated as secured only “to the extent of the value of 
such creditor’s interest” in the collateral, with the remainder of the creditor’s claim treated as 
unsecured. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). Alternatively, an undersecured creditor holding a valid lien on the 
debtor’s property may elect to have its claim treated as fully secured by making an election under 11 
U.S.C. § 1111(b). 
247. The precarious position of junior, undersecured creditors was recently highlighted in In re 
Consol. Bedding, Inc., No. 09-11875, 2021 WL 2638594 (Bankr. D. Del. June 25, 2021), which 
reaffirmed a first lien creditor’s rights with respect to collateral shared with a subordinated second 
lien creditor. Although the opinion focuses on provisions of an intercreditor agreement, the outcome 
of the case—that the second lien creditor was not entitled to a distribution—drives home the 
importance of priority, dilution, and collateral value. Id. at *5. 
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acceptable risks for competitive transactions negotiated among 
sophisticated parties.248 But as the following section explores, it is 
difficult to imagine that lenders would, collectively, agree to hostile 
restructurings as an effective solution to the traditional obstacles that 
impede fair and efficient out-of-court restructurings. 
B. Hostile Restructurings Violate Theoretical Justifications for 
Nonconsensual Restructurings 
Hostile restructurings afford companies the power to unilaterally 
impair lender rights and interests—in economic substance if not in legal 
form—in ways that, if permissible at all, would only be permitted in 
bankruptcy. In essence, these are mini cramdown plans. This may be 
why proponents of hostile restructurings often justify their actions by 
citing the broad policy goals of bankruptcy law.249 
It may be helpful, then, to consider whether hostile restructurings 
comply with classical and emergent theoretical justifications for 
nonconsensual interventions in bankruptcy. Consider, for instance, the 
traditional “Creditors’ Bargain” theoretical paradigm.250 Under this 
model, bankruptcy laws—which naturally interfere with creditors’ state 
law rights—are explained as satisfying a hypothetical ex ante 
negotiation among all of a firm’s creditors. Although each would fare 
better outside of bankruptcy if it could ensure its success in the 
proverbial race to the courthouse, bankruptcy provides the next-best 
alternative by promising a fair and efficient collective regime that 
promises to treat similarly-situated creditors the same way. 
More recently, Professor Casey has advanced a more nuanced 
theoretical justification for bankruptcy laws: they “solve the incomplete 
contracting problem that accompanies financial distress.”251 This “New 
Bargaining Theory,” as Professor Casey refers to it,252 shifts attention 
away from a purely hypothetical ex ante negotiation, focusing instead on 
 
248. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
249. For instance, Serta defended its hostile restructuring on the grounds that it was the only way 
to overcome the senior lenders’ superior bargaining position and restructure its financial obligations. 
See supra notes 148–149 and accompanying text. 
250. For a classic presentation of the creditors’ bargain theory, see Thomas H. Jackson, 
Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 862 
(1982), which explains that bankruptcy processes help to offset the “strategic costs that would 
otherwise be associated with a race to the courthouse”. 
251. Anthony J. Casey, Chapter 11’s Renegotiation Framework and the Purpose of Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1709, 1711 (2020). 
252. Id. at 1716. 
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the actual “renegotiation framework” that chapter 11 provides. Viewed 
in this light, chapter 11’s rules and structures are best understood as an 
attempt to help parties overcome the impasses that naturally arise when 
certain types of scarcity—such as highly complex and uncertain 
situations of corporate financial distress—are governed by incomplete 
contracts. 
Hostile restructurings violate the norms and principles reflected in 
both of these theoretical frameworks.253 It is difficult to imagine that 
lenders would collectively agree, ex ante, to tactics of this sort as a way 
to overcome their coordination problems and restructure their 
obligations out of court. This is because, from the lenders’ collective 
perspective, hostile restructurings are neither fair nor efficient. For one 
thing, hostile restructurings allocate economic burdens to excluded 
lenders with few, if any, legal safeguards. And, for reasons I describe 
below, hostile restructurings are likely to cause the lender group to incur 
additional monitoring and transaction costs—all for the privilege of 
leaving value on the proverbial negotiation table. 
And, while there is no clear evidence that senior lenders prefer the 
off-the-rack renegotiation framework offered under chapter 11, there is 
at least some evidence of the restructuring process syndicated lenders 
would prefer. Such evidence can be found in the voluntary norms and 
standards that have been adopted in the industry. For instance, the 
nonbinding LSTA Procedures for Credit Agreement Modifications (the 
“LSTA Procedures”),254 developed by a working group consisting of 
representatives from the largest agent banks, provide voluntary standards 
for out-of-court syndicated loan restructurings.255 The LSTA Procedures 
detail a process in which restructuring proposals are channeled through 
the administrative agent, who then disseminates the information to all 
lenders—both in written form and by coordinating conference calls with 
the company—so that each lender may decide whether to consent.256 
 
253. While the law and economics paradigm continues to prevail in modern bankruptcy law, 
other theoretical paradigms ultimately identify similar principles of bankruptcy. For instance, legal 
philosophy suggests that a system of corporate insolvency law should promote justice, fairness, 
liberty, equality, and reasonableness. See RIZWAAN JAMEEL MOKAL, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY 
LAW: THEORY AND APPLICATION 2–10 (2005); see also SARAH PATERSON, CORPORATE 
REORGANISATION LAW AND FORCES OF CHANGE (2020); JANIS PEARL SARRA, CREDITOR RIGHTS 
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: RESTRUCTURING INSOLVENT CORPORATIONS (2003).  
254. Exhibit H, Octagon Credit Invs., LLC v. NYDJ Apparel, LLC, No. 656677/2017 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Nov. 1, 2017) (providing a copy of the LSTA Procedures for Credit Agreement Modifications). 
255. On the history and purpose of the working group, see generally Working Out Syndication 
Ground Rules, AM. BANKER (Nov. 8, 2001, 2:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/wor
king-out-syndication-ground-rules (last visited Oct. 18, 2021). 
256. See Exhibit H, supra note 254. 
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Similar nonbinding, norms-based debt restructuring principles have been 
advanced by other market participants and industry associations around 
the world; these principles similarly emphasize the sharing of 
information with all creditors and the existence of an intracreditor 
governance structure that advances the interests of the creditors 
collectively.257 
Instead of following procedures of this sort, hostile restructurings 
exploit existing agency problems among syndicated lenders, leading to 
further breakdowns in governance and increased economic burdens. As 
discussed above, most modern syndicated loan agreements are designed 
to overcome the holdout problem by allowing restructurings to take 
place with less-than-unanimous consent. Implicit in this design is an 
assumption that the majority will exercise consent rights in the best 
interests of all lenders—and not simply to enhance its own self-interests 
at the expense of the minority. Unfortunately, there is often no clear 
legal or contractual obligation to act in the best interests of the entire 
group and, as the case studies reveal, companies use these agency 
problems to their own advantage. 
While hostile restructurings may admittedly delay or even prevent 
liquidations, they also impose increased monitoring costs on lender 
groups, as each lender must do its own redundant monitoring to ensure 
that it does not find itself on the losing end of a hostile restructuring. The 
ensuing lender arms race manifests ex ante as more contentious loan 
negotiations and defensive draftsmanship, and ex post as further 
fractionalization and self-protective posturing in restructuring 
negotiations. These dynamics, in turn, threaten the overall fairness and 
efficiency of all restructuring processes—whether within or outside of 
court—that have come to rely on collaboration and consensus. For 
instance, recent chapter 11 cases have featured minority lender ad hoc 
groups formed by minority lenders to oppose restructuring decisions that 
they believe advance the interests of other stakeholders—including their 
co-lenders—at their expense.258 And, as the following section explains, 
the costs do not end with the parties directly impacted by these 
transactions. 
 
257. See JOSE M. GARRIDO, WORLD BANK, OUT-OF-COURT DEBT RESTRUCTURING 39–47 (2012) 
(discussing the so-called “London Approach” and the INSOL Principles—two prominent examples 
of nonbinding, norms-based debt restructuring principles). 
258. See sources cited supra note 19. 
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C. Hostile Restructurings May Cause Dangerous Ripple Effects in the 
Capital Markets 
Hostile restructurings also have the potential to cause 
counterproductive outcomes and other inefficiencies in the capital 
markets. Because corporate shareholders and managers often prefer to 
restructure rather than liquidate, powerful lender groups have 
traditionally served as a check on the impulse to engage in economically 
irrational restructurings.259 But hostile restructurings override this 
protective mechanism by interjecting new incentives for lenders to 
engage in restructurings simply to defend themselves. This makes them 
more likely to agree to restructurings that are not otherwise 
economically justified. 
Hostile restructurings are also likely to cause a “race for the 
bottom”260 in the market for debt restructurings. With lenders highly 
incentivized to do whatever it takes to ensure that they receive the 
concentrated economic benefits offered only to participating lenders, 
they are forced to essentially negotiate against themselves. There is little 
incentive to evaluate the entire consideration paid to all of the senior 
lenders collectively. This can lead to a situation where the lenders, 
collectively, leave value on the proverbial negotiation table, allowing it 
to flow down to junior stakeholders in a way that would violate absolute 
priority in a bankruptcy setting. Indeed, this is likely a primary 
motivation for engaging in hostile restructurings. 
And the ripple effects extend far beyond the debt markets. Elsewhere 
in the financial markets, hostile restructurings can have a dangerous 
signaling effect.261 Loan restructurings—like all major corporate 
 
259. Corporate decision-making in times of corporate financial distress has been the subject of 
considerable attention by the Delaware Court of Chancery. See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank 
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) 
(establishing that directors and officers of a Delaware corporation that is insolvent or in the “zone” 
of insolvency owe their fiduciary duties to stockholders and creditors). 
260. The phrase has been used to describe a variety of phenomena in commercial and corporate 
law. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 
YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974) (using the phrase to explain the prominence of Delaware corporate law).  
261. The role of monitoring and signaling in commercial law has been explored extensively in the 
literature. See Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 
YALE L.J. 49 (1982), for a classic discussion exploring the role of secured creditors in monitoring 
the firm), and Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current 
Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9–14 (1981), which questions the then-prevailing view that junior 
creditors monitor. More recently, Professors Jacoby and Janger question the applicability of this 
monitoring theory to modern corporate restructurings, where senior secured creditors purport to 
have liens in all of the debtor’s assets. Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward Janger, Tracing Equity: 
Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter 11, 96 TEX. L. REV. 673, 717–19 (2018). 
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recapitalizations—are often publicized in a positive light, with reference 
to newly invested capital and the establishment of new debt facilities. A 
press release of this sort may be construed by other market participants 
as a sign that the senior lenders—who arguably enjoy an information 
advantage relative to other stakeholders—believe that the company is 
worth restructuring because it has greater value as a going concern.262 
This signaling effect is most likely to influence new or existing junior 
stakeholders, such as shareholders and trade creditors. 
In reality, the very transactions that junior stakeholders may interpret 
as restructurings to preserve going concern value may actually be 
disguised liquidations by the most senior and well-informed 
stakeholders, who trade their existing senior position in the firm for an 
equally263 senior position in which the economic benefits are 
concentrated among fewer lenders. The senior lenders do this because 
they fear—or perhaps even know—that in a hypothetical liquidation 
there would not be enough value to allow all of the lenders to enjoy the 
economic benefits of the senior position. When viewed in this light, the 
entire hostile restructuring transaction—including any new capital 
invested into the firm—is properly understood as an attempt to shore up 
the participating lenders’ liquidation preference in exchange for allowing 
other stakeholders to siphon value away from their unwitting co-
lenders.264 While hostile restructurings may help the firm to avoid 
liquidation and enhance its value as a going concern, this benefit may be 
incidental to the true, self-interested motives of controlling stakeholders 
and participating lenders. 
For all of these reasons, the rise of hostile restructurings should be 
understood as a normative failure in the U.S. capital markets that will 
likely continue and grow worse over time. The following Part considers 
the various legal or regulatory interventions that may be used to address 
the problem. 
 
262. Signaling of this sort is studied in Christophe J. Godlewski, The Certification Value of 
Private Debt Renegotiation and the Design of Financial Contracts: Empirical Evidence from 
Europe, 53 J. BANKING & FIN. 1–17 (2015). 
263. Here, I mean that participating lenders were previously in a senior secured, first-priority 
position. After a hostile restructuring, they are also in a senior secured, first-priority position. Thus, 
while their position has changed relative to the excluded lenders, they continue to enjoy the most 
senior position in the firm’s capital structure. 
264. These dynamics are explored in Ellias & Stark, supra note 28. 
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IV. POTENTIAL LEGAL AND REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS 
TO CORRECT THE NORMATIVE FAILURE 
How can the legal or regulatory system respond to and help correct 
the normative failure of hostile restructurings? This Part considers 
various possible solutions, ranging from a purely private ordering 
response to more top-down statutory or regulatory interventions. 
Ultimately, I settle on a recommendation that courts should provide a 
more holistic, standards-based review of hostile restructurings. Although 
this solution is likely to impose substantial economic burdens in the 
short-run, in the form of increased litigation costs and greater legal 
uncertainty, it will eventually provide a roadmap that parties may 
voluntarily apply to their out-of-court restructuring transactions in order 
to avoid judicial scrutiny. But before describing the ideal form of 
judicial intervention, it is important to consider other alternative legal 
responses. The following section explores the most direct solution: 
enhanced private ordering. 
A. Private Ordering 
Hostile restructurings may be entirely prevented—or at least 
dramatically curtailed—by private ordering. In fact, some have argued 
that lax private ordering—specifically, the recent trend towards so-called 
“cov-lite” loan agreements—is to blame for hostile restructurings in the 
first place.265 If this is true, then parties to syndicated loan agreements 
may be able to restrict companies from engaging in hostile restructurings 
simply by including strict covenants and other provisions that explicitly 
forbid conduct of this sort. 
For instance, syndicated lender groups can insist, ex ante, on 
provisions that would prevent debtors from engaging in uptiering and 
drop-down transactions. Helpful provisions would include covenants 
that prohibit lien and payment subordination and non-pro-rata open 
market purchases,266 language imposing tighter restrictions on 
transactions involving the collateral and/or any unrestricted 
subsidiaries,267 limitations on new debt issuances,268 and provisions 
 
265. See, e.g., Victoria Ivashina & Boris Vallee, Weak Credit Covenants 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Rsch., Working Paper No. 27316, 2020) (analyzing a large sample of modern credit agreements, 
focusing on provisions that weaken important covenants). 
266. These are examples of so-called negative covenants, which are richly explored in Carl S. 
Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants, Property and Perfection, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 305 (1999). 
267. The need for enhanced clarity around transactions of this sort is explored in Brad Cheek, 
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requiring that all lenders have an opportunity to participate in any 
priming facilities. 
To some extent, this sort of defensive drafting is already taking place 
in the industry.269 The problem, however, is that savvy debtor companies 
and their advisors may continue to design new hostile restructurings that 
exploit other hypertechnical provisions in their loan agreements. And, 
given the high stakes involved, all parties to these transactions have 
incentives to advance novel interpretations of even the most standard 
contract terms. Indeed, one need only to look to the sovereign bond 
market for a cautionary tale: conflicting interpretations of pari passu 
clauses have generated extensive litigation, grinding restructurings to a 
halt while courts struggle to understand each side’s rights and 
obligations under the agreement.270 Acknowledging these and other 
practical realities, several commentators have recently expressed 
skepticism regarding lenders’ ability to close all of the loopholes that 
may be lurking in their agreements.271 
Another option would be for parties to include more sweeping 
provisions, such as unanimous or near-unanimous consent requirements 
or prohibitions against debtor companies negotiating directly with 
individual lenders or lender factions. In a similar way, syndicated lender 
groups could enter into side agreements, ex post, affirming their 
commitment to pro rata sharing of economic benefits and collective 
action that benefits all similarly situated lenders. 
 
Tearin’ Up iHeart: The Recent Trend with Troubled Companies and the Unrestricted Subsidiary 
Transfer Tactic, 23 N.C. BANKING INST. 271 (2019). 
268. For an example of this type of negative covenant, see Committee on Trust Indentures and 
Indenture Trustees, Model Negotiated Covenants and Related Definitions, 61 BUS. LAW. 1439, 
1500–01 (2006). 
269. See, e.g., Yoruk Bahceli, The Devil’s in The Detail for Junk Debt Investors Facing 
Coronavirus Defaults, REUTERS (Apr. 29, 2020, 10:41 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN22C0OK [https://perma.cc/L5KH-E9G9] (describing the 
“J Crew blocker” provisions). 
270. For a thorough discussion, see Natalie A. Turchi, Note, Restructuring A Sovereign Bond 
Pari Passu Work-Around: Can Holdout Creditors Ever Have Equal Treatment?, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2171 (2015). 
271. See Ellias & Stark, supra note 28, at 787 (“The lawyers who represent large firms are simply 
too skilled in the perpetual cat-and-mouse game not to find loopholes and ways around even the 
best contractual language.”); see also COVID-19: Prime Time for Priming, O’MELVENY & MYERS 
LLP (July 15, 2020), https://www.omm.com/resources/alerts-and-publications/alerts/covid-19-
prime-time-for-priming/ [https://perma.cc/W6TQ-Z346] (opining that lenders may never be able to 
close up all of the loopholes); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole 
Problem in Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1, 72 (2017) (exploring, with respect to bond 
indenture agreements, the broader tendency for stakeholders to scrutinize agreements for terms that 
others may have overlooked or mispriced).  
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But both types of agreements would be difficult to monitor and 
enforce and would likely make out-of-court restructurings far more 
difficult. Relatedly, there is a real danger that loan agreements could 
become “hyperrigid,” driving more companies into bankruptcy and 
leading to spillover effects in the capital markets.272 The following 
section swings to the other end of the proverbial pendulum, considering 
a top-down solution in the form of regulatory or statutory intervention. 
B. Regulatory or Statutory Interventions 
The problem of hostile restructurings is not a new phenomenon in the 
U.S. capital markets. In fact, many aspects of these transactions are 
reminiscent of problems that have plagued out-of-court restructurings in 
the public bond markets. In the first half of last century, the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) focused its attention on 
corporate reorganizations conducted pursuant to collective action clauses 
in bond indentures. After surveying high-profile cases, the SEC found 
that these restructurings featured numerous “abuses and problems.”273 
Notably, the SEC was concerned that controlling stakeholders were 
initiating bond restructurings in order to allocate the firm’s economic 
burdens to the bondholders.274 The concern may have also stemmed 
from stories of abusive restructurings under the equity receivership 
model used to restructure railroads prior to the enactment of a corporate 
bankruptcy reorganization statute.275 
In order to prevent abusive out-of-court bond restructurings, the SEC 
proposed, and Congress enacted, section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture 
Act (“TIA”).276 This section prohibits amendments to bond indentures 
that purport to bind nonconsenting bondholders to a reduction in their 
right to receive payment.277 The language effectively forecloses out-of-
court bond restructurings that reduce the amount of principal outstanding 
 
272. For an in-depth look at the problem of hyperrigid securitization agreements, see Anna 
Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout Prohibitions in Residential 
Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (2009). 
273. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF 
THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION 
COMMITTEES, PART VI at 150 (1936). 
274. See Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 250–52 
(1987). 
275. Stephen J. Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 89 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1420 (2004). 
276. Pub. L. No 76-253, 53 Stat. 1149, 1173 (1939) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp). 
277. See id. 
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or the interest rate applicable to the debt.278 
The existence of section 316(b), and the history that led to its 
enactment, provides important precedent for a similar type of top-down 
regulatory or statutory response to hostile loan restructurings. But 
drafting a statute or regulation of this sort would be difficult. A rule 
modeled after section 316(b) would fail to capture many types of hostile 
restructurings, as these transactions do not always technically impair 
payment rights; instead, these transactions tend to impact the economic 
substance of payment priority and lien rights. It would be difficult to 
develop a standard that would fully capture all potential forms of hostile 
restructurings without going too far and essentially foreclosing the 
possibility of out-of-court loan restructurings. 
And, even if such a rule could be designed to be comprehensive 
without being overbroad, syndicated loan notes are not traditionally 
viewed as securities, and so there is not currently a regulatory 
infrastructure in place to monitor and enforce compliance with such a 
provision in the syndicated loan market. Finally, the benefits of 
section 316(b) in the parallel world of bond restructurings are hotly 
disputed in the academic literature.279 Such thorough and well-reasoned 
critiques not only call into question the wisdom of adopting a similar 
rule for loan restructurings; they would also make it practically 
impossible to pass such a measure. 
But while syndicated loans are not traditionally subject to any 
specialized legal or regulatory regime, they are subject to the laws 
generally, including state contract law. And disputes arising under these 
agreements are subject to the jurisdiction of state and federal courts. 
Accordingly, the following section considers the possibility of a judicial 
solution to the problem of hostile restructurings. 
C. Judicial Intervention 
Given the challenges and limitations associated with a pure private 
ordering solution, on the one hand, and a top-down statutory or 
regulatory response, on the other, the best solution is for courts to 
provide a more holistic, standards-based review of hostile restructurings. 
 
278. For a thorough discussion of the mechanics of section 316(b), see Bratton & Levitin, supra 
note 44, at 1615–18. 
279. See, e.g., Bratton & Levitin, supra note 44, at 1602 (arguing for repeal); Harold B. 
Groendyke, Note, A Renewed Need for Collective Action: The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 and Out-
of-Court Restructurings, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1239, 1241 (2016) (arguing for “a new Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) rule that requires all out-of-court restructurings with bondholders to 
be negotiated by an uncoerced majority vote”). 
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In this regard, I join a chorus of corporate and commercial law scholars 
who have made recent calls for greater judicial involvement in 
commercial finance disputes. For instance, scholars have called for 
greater judicial scrutiny of corporate decision-making in times of 
financial distress in order to counterbalance the moral hazards that lead 
managers to favor some stakeholders at the expense of others.280 Others 
have argued that, in the case of out-of-court bond debt restructurings, 
section 316(b) should be repealed in favor of the renewed application of 
a “long forgotten, but still valid, equity doctrine of intercreditor good 
faith duties.”281 
Judicial intervention in hostile restructurings can take many forms. It 
can be as simple as a renewed emphasis on existing legal and equitable 
principles, such as the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Or it can be as complex as courts superimposing a formal restructuring 
regime based on the Bankruptcy Code—or any other modern or 
historical insolvency regime, for that matter. 
As one example of the latter type of intervention, courts could subject 
hostile restructurings to something like the chapter 11 plan confirmation 
standards. In lawsuits brought by excluded lenders alleging that a 
restructuring is an unlawful hostile restructuring, debtor companies 
could be required to defend the restructuring and establish its lawfulness 
by making a showing that it did not unfairly discriminate against the 
excluded lenders and that it treated them fairly and equitably. In 
developing suitable standards, it would be assumed that courts would 
borrow heavily from bankruptcy law; corporate law’s entire fairness 
standard would also provide a useful corollary.282 Then, depending on 
the nature of the allegations raised by the excluded lenders, the court 
may import other, finer rules and principles of bankruptcy and corporate 
law. For instance, in cases involving allegations of consent 
gerrymandering, courts could draw from bankruptcy jurisprudence on 
so-called class gerrymandering used by some debtors to manufacture an 
accepting impaired class in chapter 11.283 
But this type of judicial intervention suffers from some obvious 
 
280. See Ellias & Stark, supra note 28. 
281. Bratton & Levitin, supra note 44, at 1602. 
282. There is some Delaware precedent for applying the entire fairness standard to corporate 
finance transactions. See IRA Trust FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, No. 12742, 2017 WL 7053964, 
at *9 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2017) (finding that a recapitalization was a “conflicted controller 
transaction” that invoked entire fairness review). 
283. Class gerrymandering in bankruptcy is explored in In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 
F.2d 1274, 1279–80 (5th Cir. 1991). 
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drawbacks. For one thing, this process would undermine the very notion 
of an “out-of-court” restructuring, as debtor companies must be prepared 
to make a showing that their allegedly hostile restructuring satisfies the 
requisite judicial standard. In practice, this means that all out-of-court 
restructurings that feature some interlender conflict would essentially be 
subject to the same legal hurdles as prepackaged bankruptcies—albeit 
with expanded opportunities for corporate stakeholders to forum shop 
across both federal and state courts.284 This would increase costs and 
legal uncertainty considerably. 
As one potential solution, Congress could amend the Bankruptcy 
Code to provide a streamlined process for reviewing and approving 
hostile restructurings, much like the recent chapter 16 proposals for bond 
restructurings.285 But without some sort of clear statutory prohibition on 
hostile restructurings (such that all parties understand that they must 
submit to the streamlined bankruptcy proceeding in order to move 
forward), any such proceeding would likely be marred by disputes 
grounded in state contract law. For instance, disputes would likely center 
on the question of whether a proposed restructuring is in fact a hostile 
restructuring that ought to be conducted through the streamlined 
bankruptcy proceeding, or whether it is simply a garden-variety exercise 
of rights clearly set forth in the underlying loan agreement. Similar to 
the eligibility battles that often accompany chapter 9 bankruptcy filings, 
these disputes have the potential to spill across several forums, driving 
up costs and introducing new forms of legal uncertainty. 
The better solution, then, is for all courts to approach disputes arising 
out of loan restructurings with a renewed emphasis on existing legal and 
equitable principles, such as the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. As discussed above, under basic principles of state contract law, 
the implied covenant is generally understood to mean that parties to 
contracts should behave honestly and work to uphold the spirit of the 
agreement.286 Parties to contracts should not, for instance, undermine the 
 
284. Much ink has been spilled on the current problem of forum shopping in bankruptcy. See 
generally, e.g., Laura Napoli Coordes, The Geography of Bankruptcy, 68 VAND. L. REV. 381 (2015) 
(critiquing the practice of forum shopping and proposing procedural solutions); LYNN M. LOPUCKI, 
COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY 
COURTS (2005) (asserting that forum shopping has caused bankruptcy judges to compete with one 
another for large cases, to the detriment of the bankruptcy system and most stakeholders). 
285. Chapter 16 proposals are described in Mark J. Roe, The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 in 
Congress and the Courts in 2016: Bringing the SEC to the Table, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 360, 374 
(2016). 
286. See, e.g., 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co., 773 N.E.2d 496, 500 (N.Y. 
2002) (explaining that the “covenant embraces a pledge that ‘neither party shall do anything which 
will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the 
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rights of their counterparties to receive the benefits of the bargain. 
Under New York law—which governs most large syndicated bank 
loan agreements—the implied covenant is breached “when a party acts 
in a manner that would deprive the other party of the right to receive the 
benefits of their agreement.”287 The implied covenant encompasses those 
“promises which a reasonable promisee would be justified in 
understanding were included.”288 Moreover, “[a] party may be in breach 
of its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing even if it is not in 
breach of its express contractual obligations” to the extent such party’s 
actions “destroy or injure the right of another party to receive the 
benefits of the contract.”289 
Of course, the courts hearing disputes arising out of hostile 
restructurings have always had the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing at their disposal. Indeed, it was raised by plaintiffs in cases 
profiled in this Article, and it inspired one court to deny a motion to 
dismiss.290 The problem is that in order to reach a decision on the merits, 
the implied covenant demands a deeply contextual review, taking into 
account all of the facts and circumstances of the case.291 But the courts 
hearing commercial finance disputes do so in the shadow of decades of 
precedent establishing that courts should not interfere with the smooth 
functioning of the capital markets by applying thorny judicial doctrines 
or, worse yet, interposing new judge-made law.292 Instead, in the name 
of preserving legal certainty, predictability, and uniformity and ensuring 
the smooth functioning of the credit markets, courts should simply 
enforce the plain language of the agreement and otherwise stay out of 
the dispute.293 
For courts already so inclined to abstain in the name of certainty, 
predictability, and uniformity, the implied covenant provides a ready 
doctrinal out: case law establishes that the implied covenant should not 
 
contract’” (quoting Dalton v. Educ. Testing Serv., 663 N.E.2d 289, 291 (N.Y. 1995))). 
287. 1357 Tarrytown Rd. Auto, LLC v. Granite Properties, LLC, 37 N.Y.S.3d 341, 343 (App. 
Div. 2016). 
288. Id. 
289. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Keystone Distribs., Inc., 873 F. Supp. 808, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
290. See supra section II.A; Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 158. 
291. “[A]s Delaware judges, lawyers, and scholars alike have all acknowledged, the implied 
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an inherently contextual, standards-based, and, 
therefore, indeterminate doctrine.” Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A 
Theory of Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 246 (2011). 
292. See generally Dick, supra note 14. 
293. See id. 
Lourdes-Dick (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2021  9:47 PM 
1386 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:1333 
 
be used to contradict the express provisions of the agreement.294 For 
instance, courts have found that there is no violation of the implied 
covenant where the agreement unambiguously affords a party the right 
to take some action or exercise some discretion.295 
With respect to hostile restructurings, then, the first challenge is 
overcoming courts’ own reluctance to engage in a deep contextual 
review. Then, the second challenge is overcoming the argument that 
each and every step taken in the restructuring was technically in 
compliance with the plain language of the loan agreement. With respect 
to the first challenge, although it is true that heightened judicial scrutiny 
would introduce new forms of legal uncertainty into the capital markets, 
this risk is outweighed by the benefits of correcting the normative failure 
of hostile restructurings. For all of the reasons provided in Part III, 
hostile restructurings themselves have the potential to cause dangerous 
ripple effects. Accordingly, legal intervention is in fact needed to 
preserve and protect legal certainty and the smooth functioning of the 
capital markets. 
Regarding the second challenge, there are two ways courts can move 
beyond arguments that the transactions are protected from scrutiny 
because they technically comply with the express provisions of the 
agreement. First, courts can take a page from tax and corporate law and 
apply a “step-transaction approach” that treats multiple transactions that 
occur contemporaneously as one transaction.296 This would allow for a 
more expansive inquiry that focuses judicial attention on the overall 
economic effect of a string of transactions rather than the technical 
permissibility of each individual step.297 In a similar way, courts can 
 
294. 767 Third Ave. LLC v. Greble & Finger, LLP, 778 N.Y.S.2d 157, 158 (App. Div. 2004). 
295. See, e.g., ELBT Realty, LLC v. Mineola Garden City Co., 42 N.Y.S.3d 304, 304 (App. Div. 
2016) (explaining that the implied covenant should not be used to override an express provision in a 
contract stating “that the purchaser could terminate the contract in ‘its sole discretion’ and for ‘any 
reason whatsoever’”); Moran v. Erk, 901 N.E.2d 187, 192 (N.Y. 2008) (interpreting an attorney 
approval contingency clause according to its plain meaning); Nat’l Westminster Bank, U.S.A. v. 
Ross, 130 B.R. 656, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (declining “to imply an obligation of good faith 
inconsistent with other express terms of the parties contractual relationship”). 
296. The doctrine can be traced to the classic tax case, Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 
(1935). In Gregory, the Court criticized the practice of “exalt[ing] artifice above reality,” instead 
urging courts to “fix[] the character of the proceeding by what actually occurred.” Id. at 469–70. 
This focus on the bigger picture revealed the transactions at issue to be “an elaborate and devious 
form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing else.” Id. at 470; see 
also Am. Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194, 202–05 (Cl. Ct. 1968) (further 
describing the step-transaction doctrine in modern tax law). 
297. There is some modern precedent for applying the step-transaction doctrine to commercial 
finance agreements. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 691 F.2d 1039, 1050–52 (2d 
Cir. 1982) (suggesting, in the way it analyzed whether an issuer had sold “substantially all” of its 
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engage in more holistic reviews that consider whether the hostile 
restructuring, as a whole, violates the plain language and spirit of the 
original loan agreement. Indeed, hostile restructurings are likely to 
violate the plain language and spirit of senior secured loan agreements 
that reflect both a collective design298 and an intent to share ratably the 
economic risks and benefits. 
Here, the focus should be on whether, taking into account the overall 
effect of the restructuring, existing creditors have been treated fairly and 
equitably—not simply whether they are ultimately afforded equal 
treatment.299 Courts may develop a list of factors to evaluate the fairness 
of a particular restructuring proposal. For instance, courts should closely 
examine the exclusive nature of the restructuring proposal: a proposal 
that is offered to all or substantially all of the existing lenders is less 
likely to constitute a hostile restructuring; in contrast, courts should be 
more suspicious of proposals that are only offered to the number of 
lenders necessary to overcome applicable consent thresholds. Similarly, 
courts should consider the level of participation by existing lenders: a 
proposal—particularly one that was offered to all or substantially all of 
the lenders—is unlikely to constitute a hostile restructuring if it has 
garnered the support of an overwhelming majority of the existing 
lenders. 
Secrecy, as well as efforts by the proposal sponsor to “divide and 
conquer” the lender group, are also important factors to consider. A 
proposal is more likely to constitute a hostile restructuring when it is the 
product of negotiations with lenders who promise to keep information 
concerning the proposal away from other lenders. In contrast, proposals 
that are directed to the administrative agent for simultaneous distribution 
to all lenders are unlikely to constitute hostile restructurings, even if they 
contain aggressive terms. Finally, attempts by the debtor company to 
manufacture or “gerrymander” consent—such as by issuing new debt or 
debt commitments on the eve of solicitation—are highly indicative of a 
hostile restructuring. 
Of course, it is important to acknowledge that any form of heightened 
judicial scrutiny will naturally impose substantial economic burdens in 
the short run, in the form of increased litigation costs and greater legal 
 
assets, that a series of transactions can be considered as a collective whole). 
298. For a classic case finding that corporate debt agreements evidence a collective design, see 
Beal Sav. Bank v. Sommer, 865 N.E.2d 318 (N.Y. 2007). 
299. Equality among creditors, as Professor Skeel argues, is a rather meaningless virtue in 
modern bankruptcy law. See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors”, 166 U. 
PA. L. REV. 699 (2018). 
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uncertainty. But after several high-profile cases, companies, their 
stakeholders, and their advisors would have a template to follow in 
designing fair and efficient out-of-court restructuring transactions that 
avoid judicial scrutiny altogether.300 And over time, voluntary 
practices—such as the solicitation of fairness opinions to assess hostile 
restructuring transactions—may evolve to help parties focus on the 
economic substance of the transaction and potentially even iron out their 
disputes at an earlier stage in the process. In this way, judicial 
intervention has the potential to provide a uniquely fair, efficient, and 
targeted solution to the new and burgeoning problem of hostile 
restructurings. 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. capital markets increasingly feature what I call “hostile 
restructurings”: out-of-court syndicated loan restructuring transactions 
that rely on aggressive negotiation tactics to overcome not only the 
traditional lender holdout problem, but also the collective bargaining 
power of the entire lender group. These transactions require corrective 
intervention, ideally by the courts. But to answer this call to service, 
courts must overcome decades of precedent establishing that judges 
should not interfere with the smooth functioning of the capital markets 
by applying thorny judicial doctrines to commercial finance disputes or, 
worse yet, by interposing new judge-made law. By showcasing the many 
ways in which hostile restructurings constitute a normative failure in the 
capital markets, this Article provides both the call to action and the 
theoretical justification for a fair, efficient, and effective form of judicial 




300. Professor Skeel similarly argues that a few high-profile cases have the potential to help 
clarify legal standards, reducing the need for future litigation. Skeel, supra note 62, at 377. 
